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This dissertation consists of three chapters, each representing a self-contained research 
paper in health economics. 
The first chapter formalizes a model which generalizes several political models of 
collective action and regime change. It considers the impact that an extremist party can have on 
the choices made by the population in choosing whether or not to take part in a revolt. This third 
party is usually a personal interest group that benefits from a revolution, or in some cases 
benefits from the current regime in power, and thus will try to persuade the general population 
into pursuing an action that is in the extremist’s best interest. The paper presents several 
applications of the model with political and economic roots. These models add insight to 
revolutions in the present day as well as throughout history, particularly those aided by outside 
benefactors.(JEL codes: D5,D72,D91) 
In the second chapter, I study the effect that NCLB had on teacher turnover and compare 
it to the impact from state accountability systems that existed prior to the passage of NCLB. I 
find that, while state accountability systems have no significant effect on teacher turnover, 
teachers are 5 percentage points more likely to remain in the field following NCLB. The driving 
force behind this result is the year that a teacher earned his or her bachelor’s degree. Receiving a 
bachelor’s degree after 2002 makes an individual 27 percentage points more likely to stay in the 
field after NCLB was passed. I believe there is a self-selection process to explain this result, as 
after NCLB became law only those individuals who felt comfortable teaching under an 
accountability system earned their education degree and became a teacher. I find further 
evidence of this result by considering where the teachers earned their degrees. The state where a 
teacher earned their degree does not have a large effect on the likelihood of continuing to teach, 
regardless of whether or not that state had some kind of prior accountability system. This 
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suggests that the self-selection process occurs before the individuals earn their degree, and not in 
response to a change in curriculum from the college or university at which they earned their 
degree. (JEL codes: I28, J08, J48) 
In the third chapter, I consider a teacher’s response to earning tenure as it relates to 
classroom performance. For elementary and secondary school teachers, earning tenure makes it 
very expensive and time consuming for a school to terminate them. Critics of tenure argue that 
this creates an incentive for teachers to expend less effort and energy into their teaching as they 
are able to avoid the penalty of job loss. There is a long research history of teacher characteristics 
and the effects they have on student achievement. Surprisingly, the impact of earning tenure 
remains unknown. This chapter uses student level data and pairs it with teacher and school 
characteristics in order to find the effect earning tenure has on test scores. By taking advantage 
of the staggered issuance of tenure, we can isolate the impact of earning tenure. I find that 
immediately after being awarded tenure, student test scores drop. However, they increase and 
overtake previous scores the following year. This suggests teachers earn extra benefit when their 
students are successful, and thereby, resist the incentive to provide lower quality teaching. (JEL 
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1 A Generalization of Models of Collective Action and Regime Change 
 
.Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to formalize a model which generalizes several political 
models. We will mainly examine models of collective action and regime change. We will also 
consider the impact that an extremist party can have on the choices made by the population. This 
third party is usually a personal interest group who benefits from a revolution and thus will try to 
persuade the general population into revolting. An easy example of this would be arms dealers 
who receive increased sales if a revolution were to occur. Clearly this type of model can be used 
to add insight to revolutions in the present day as well as throughout history. However, the uses 
of this model can expand even beyond these examples. 
Take, for example, adoption of a new technology. This is also an example of a regime 
change; the players are deciding whether or not to adopt this new technological advancement or 
to keep the current method in place. There is even a third party who is trying to sway the public 
opinion into adopting the new technology. This “extremist" may be the company in charge of 
new technology and their payoff increases as more people adopt their advancement. In this 
example, the “extremist" action could be the amount of advertising they choose to purchase in an 
attempt to increase the number of citizens who adopt their technology. 
The layout of the paper is as follows: The first section contains the model of interest and 
defines the necessary variables. I then look at existence theorems and examine some applications 






Imagine there is a current regime governing a country. As with all regimes a revolt is a 
very real concern. Represent the current population being governed as a continuum of players 
each deciding whether to participate in the revolt or not. We will say that if a player plays action 
𝑎1 then they participate in the revolt and if that player plays action 𝑎0 then they do not 
participate in the revolt. 
The population has some anti-government sentiment, Θ, which is normally distributed 
with mean θ and variance 𝜎𝛩
2. That is Θ~N(θ, 𝜎𝛩
2). This variable represents how much the 
population as a whole values a change of regime. In addition, each citizen has his or her own 
personal anti-government sentiment, 𝜃𝑖, given by the equation: 𝜃𝑖 = 𝛩 + 𝑖 with 𝑖 normally 
distributed with mean 0 and variance 𝜎2, ε~N(0, 𝜎2 ). It is important to note that Θ and 𝑖 are 
independent from each other for each i. So, each player has type 𝜃𝑖 which measures the benefit 
that player i earns if the current regime is overthrown, and that benefit is some independent 
deviation away from the population mean. 
Additionally, each citizen has a type associated with his or her cost of revolting, 𝑐𝑖, which 
is uniformly distributed over positive values in the interval [𝑐, 𝑐]. So 𝑐𝑖~U(𝑐, 𝑐) where 0 < 𝑐 < 𝑐. 
It would not make sense for the typical player to have a negative cost of revolting, which is why 
we have the positive restrictions on the values of 𝑐 and 𝑐. 
The payoff for player i is given by the following matrix: 
 
  Result of Revolt 
  Success Failure 
𝑃𝑖 𝑎1= revolt 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜌 − 𝑐𝑖 𝑠 − 𝜇 − 𝑐𝑖 




Let N measure the proportion of the population that chooses to revolt. To formulate a 
realistic uncertainty of the result of the revolt, we will let the success of the revolt be dependent 
on N. That is Pr(success) = N. The variables 𝜃𝑖 and 𝑐𝑖 are player's individual types drawn as 
described above. The status quo payoff, s, is the payoff received by each player under the current 
regime. The value s is common knowledge for all players. Thus if a revolution fails everyone 
earns a payoff of s. Finally, notice that in the event of a successful revolution, there is a reward 
reserved for those citizens who participated in the revolution. 
This “privilege” is equal to ρ with (0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1) this means that in a successful revolution 
everyone receives 𝜃𝑖, but the additional ρ is reserved for those who helped to overthrow the 
previous regime. This means there is an incentive for a player to revolt (play 𝑎1) if he or she 
believes that a revolution will be successful. 
After learning his or her types, player i formulates beliefs about the anti-government 
sentiment of the whole population, Θ. To do this I will use Bayes' Rule in the case of normal 
priors and normal signals as seen in Degroot (1970) and I use Morris and Shin (2003) in the case 
of uniform priors and posteriors. This gives us a posterior belief for player i. He or she now 
believes that Θ is normally distributed with mean 𝜃?̅? and variance 𝜎1
2 where 𝜃?̅? = 𝜆𝜃𝑖 + (1 − 𝜆)?̅? 
and 𝜎1






. Notice that 𝜃?̅? is increasing in 𝜃𝑖, this means that the more anti-
government an individual is the more anti-government he or she believes the rest of the 
population is, and thereby increases the likelihood that he or she will choose to revolt (play 𝑎1). 
As in Baliga and Sjostrom (2012), we will add an “extremist" party to this model whose 
goal is to manipulate the actions chosen by the population in order to increase its own payoff. 
The extremists choose to expend some level of energy on producing a signal which will be 
observed by the population. The players then update their beliefs again before playing the 
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revolution game. The extremist chooses some level of effort, e in [0,1), which they will use to 
send a message which will be seen by the entire population. The message is a public signal 
which will send the population some information about the true value of Θ similar to the policy 
effects in Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006). Notice that the extremist does not know the true 
value of Θ but rather is trying to convince the general population that Θ is large and therefore the 
population's anti-government sentiment is high. The message, 𝑚(), is a function of population 
anti-government sentiment, Θ, and effort, e. In particular, 𝑚(𝛩, 𝑒)  =  𝛩 + 𝑒 + 𝜂, with η 
normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 𝜎𝜂
2, 𝜂~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜂
2). Notice that the message the 
extremist sends increases in both Θ and e, this implies that the more anti-government sentiment 
present in a society the easier it is to persuade that population to revolt. Edmond (2013) finds that 
the number of information manipulations that a population witness makes the regime easier to 
overthrow. This can be represented in my model by aggregating all the messages received into 
one value of m. 
As mentioned above, after the extremist issues their message, the population updates their 
beliefs for a second time. Following the information gained from the extremist's message, player 
i now has beliefs that Θ is normally distributed with mean ?̅̿? and variance of 𝜎2
2.                       
?̅̿? = 𝜓(𝑚 − 𝑒 ∗) + (1 − 𝜓)?̿? and 𝜎2
2 = 𝜓𝜎𝜂






. In addition, each member of the 
population has some belief about the level of effort expended by the extremists. I denote this 
value as e* and acknowledge that this value is common knowledge between all players. 
At this point, player i has some belief about the value of Θ, as well as having received his 
or her cost signal. So, player i can use the available information to generate one type that 
uniquely describes himself or herself, 𝑦𝑖 = 𝜃𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖.  Then, he or she can use 𝑦𝑖 to formulate some 
beliefs about player j's signal 𝑦𝑗 = 𝜃𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗. From the information received up to this point, player 
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i believes that the opposing player's signal is normally distributed with mean ?̅̿? − 𝑐𝑖 and variance 
𝜎2
2.  
The sequence of the game is as follows: 
1. Players receive their types and formulate beliefs about other players 
2. The extremist sends their message 
3. Players update their beliefs 
4. The Revolution Game is played 
The extremist party receives their payoff after the revolution game is played as it is 
dependent on the number of citizens who revolt. The payoff for the extremists is given by 
𝑢(𝑁) − 𝑓(𝑒) where 𝑢(𝑁) describes the benefit received when a proportion N of the population 
chooses to revolt. Furthermore, 𝑓(𝑒) measures the cost of exerting e level of effort. Notice that, 
𝜕
𝜕𝑁
𝑢(𝑁) ≥ 0 and 
𝜕
𝜕𝑒
𝑓(𝑒) ≥ 0 . 
We now consider the previously introduced variable, 𝑦𝑖 = 𝜃𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖. It can be seen that 𝑦𝑖 
is the benefit of revolting minus the cost of revolting for player i. A player will revolt if 𝑦𝑖 is 
large enough. This is similar to saying that if 𝜃𝑖, the benefit of revolting, is large enough or if 𝑐𝑖, 
the cost of revolting, is small enough then player i benefits more from revolting (playing 𝑎1) than 
if he or she chose to not revolt (play 𝑎0). I will assume that the players will play a cutoff strategy. 
That is, given some cutoff point x, player i will choose to revolt if and only if 𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝑥, otherwise 
he or she will not revolt. 
We begin by finding the expected payoff for player i if he chooses to revolt. 
𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)(𝜃𝑖 + 𝜌 − 𝑐𝑖)  +  (1 − 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠))(𝑠 − 𝜇 − 𝑐𝑖)                             (1.1) 
Similarly, we find the expected payoff for player i if he chooses to not revolt. 
𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)( 𝜃𝑖) + (1 − 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠))(𝑠)                                              (1.2) 
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As mentioned above, player i will choose to revolt if equation (1.1) is greater than 
equation (1.2). That is, if  
𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)(𝜃𝑖 + 𝜌 − 𝑐𝑖)  +  (1 − 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠))(𝑠 − 𝜇 − 𝑐𝑖) ≥ 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)( 𝜃𝑖) +  (1 − 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠))(𝑠).  
Rearranging this inequality we obtain expected net payoff. 
𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝜌 − 𝜇 +  𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝜇 − 𝑐𝑖 ≥ 0                                          (1.3) 
If equation (1.3) is true then player i will choose to revolt. Note if the left hand side of 
equation (1.3) is equal to 0 then player i is indifferent between revolting and not revolting, but 
for the purposes of this paper we will assume that he or she will revolt. 
Now we consider player j's best response if player i follows the strategy defined using the 
expected net payoff function above. To achieve this best response function I use the strategy 
found in Baliga and Sjostrom (2011) and subtract 𝑦𝑗 from player i's expected net payoff and 
multiply by -1. This results in the inequality: 
𝑦𝑗 ≥ 𝜃𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑃𝑟 (𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝜌 + 𝜇 − 𝑃𝑟 (𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝜇                                     (1.4)  
Notice that equation (1.4) is a cutoff rule for player j. Thus, given the probability of a 
successful revolution, 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠), player j will revolt and play 𝑎1 if and only if the inequality 
in equation (1.4) is true. It is also important to note that this can be expanded a further. First, 
assume player i is playing the strategy defined by cutoff point x, then  
𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)  =  𝑃𝑟(𝜃𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 ≥ 𝑥). 
In fact, by using Player j’s beliefs about Player i’s type we find  
𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)  =  (1 − 𝛷(




where Φ is the CDF of a normal distribution. Thus, equation (1.4) becomes 
𝑦𝑗 ≥ 𝜃𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗 + 𝑐𝑖 − (1 − 𝛷(
𝑥 − ?̿̅? + 𝑐𝑖
√𝜎2
2
)) 𝜌 + (𝛷(
𝑥 − ?̿̅? + 𝑐𝑖
√𝜎2
2
) 𝜇                          (1.5) 
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Particular attention should be drawn to the right hand side of equation (1.5) as that can be 
used to define a function Γ. In the following equation, let x be a cutoff point for player -i. 
𝛤(𝑥) =  𝜃𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗 + 𝑐𝑖 − (1 − 𝛷(
𝑥 − ?̿̅? + 𝑐𝑖
√𝜎2
2
)) 𝜌 + (𝛷(
𝑥 − ?̿̅? + 𝑐𝑖
√𝜎2
2
) 𝜇                          (1.6) 
It is also important to note that I am only interested in symmetric equilibria, as discussed 
by Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011). This implies that 𝜃𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗 = 𝑦𝑗, which is equivalent to the 
cutoff point for player j. Thus the equation becomes 
𝛤(𝑥) =  𝑥 + 𝑐𝑖 − (1 − 𝛷(
𝑥 − ?̿̅? + 𝑐𝑖
√𝜎2
2
)) 𝜌 + (𝛷(
𝑥 − ?̿̅? + 𝑐𝑖
√𝜎2
2
) 𝜇                               (1.7) 
Notice that 𝛤(𝑥) is the best response function for player j. Given cutoff points for all the 
other players, this function will determine the cutoff point that player j should use to maximize 
his or her utility. More importantly, any fixed point of this function defines an equilibrium for 
the model. That is, cutoff point x is an equilibrium if 𝛤(𝑥) = 𝑥. 
I declare that at least one equilibrium for this game exists. The outcome in which each 
player chooses to never revolt is an equilibrium. That is, each player will choose to play 
𝑎0 regardless of the signal that he or she receives. This outcome is represented by having each 
player's cutoff point be equal to infinity. Thus 𝑦𝑗 < ∞ for all i, which implies that no player will 
ever revolt. Proving that this outcome is an equilibrium is easily verified by setting 𝑥 = ∞ in the 
right hand side of equation (1.5), the best response function for player j. 
Now I will show that an equilibrium in which there is a nonzero chance of participation 
exists. Since I am assuming that equilibrium is symmetric we can say that each player will play 
the same cutoff point, x. If a player has type greater than this value he or she will choose to 
revolt, but if his or her type is less than that value he or she will not revolt. However, if a player 
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has type equal to that value, 𝜃𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑥, then he or she is indifferent between revolting and not 
revolting. For those players who are indifferent, the best response function becomes 
𝛤(𝑥) =  𝑥 + 𝑐𝑖 − (1 − 𝛷(
𝑥 − ?̿̅? + 𝑐𝑖
√𝜎2
2
)) 𝜌 + (𝛷(
𝑥 − ?̿̅? + 𝑐𝑖
√𝜎2
2
) 𝜇                               (1.8) 
In equilibrium 𝛤(𝑥)  =  𝑥, thus equation (1.8) simplifies to 
0 =  𝑐𝑖 − (1 − 𝛷(
𝑥 − ?̿̅? + 𝑐𝑖
√𝜎2
2
)) 𝜌 + (𝛷(
𝑥 − ?̿̅? + 𝑐𝑖
√𝜎2
2
) 𝜇  
Therefore an equilibrium is defined by 
𝑐𝑖 = (1 − 𝛷(
𝑥 − ?̿̅? + 𝑐𝑖
√𝜎2
2
)) 𝜌 + (𝛷(
𝑥 − ?̿̅? + 𝑐𝑖
√𝜎2
2
) 𝜇                                           (1.9) 
Notice this equation states that in equilibrium the marginal player has equal cost and 
benefit of revolting. I will now use this equality to show that an equilibrium with positive 
participation exists. The second term in equation (1.7) is the probability that a revolution is 
successful, 1 − 𝛷, multiplied by the payoff that is reserved for those who chose to revolt, 
ρ and 𝛷 multiplied by the punishment incurred by revolters in a failed attempt, μ. Thus that value 
is the expected benefit received for revolting which I will now refer to as 𝐸𝐵(). 
Using this new terminology, it can be see that the best response function, equation (1.6) is 
a function of the newly defined 𝐸𝐵(). In fact, Γ(x)=𝛤(𝑥) = 𝑦𝑗 + 𝑐𝑗 − 𝐸𝐵(𝜃, 𝑐). Therefore, in 
order to achieve an equilibrium, we want𝐸𝐵(𝜃, 𝑐) = 𝑐𝑖. 







Theorem 1. Any value of θ, such that 𝐸𝐵 = 𝑐, is positive.  













) > 0 by definition. This implies that ρ and μ 
must both be positive, which is true by definition. ∎ 
 
Theorem 2. A strategy profile x which defines an equilibrium with positive participation exists if 
and only if 𝐸𝐵 =  𝑐 













.  We then create a function 𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚) = 𝐴𝜃 + 𝐵?̂? − 𝐶. This equality 
is achieved by substituting in the values of ?̿̅? and 𝑐̿ into equation (4) and then making the 
necessary substitutions for A, B, and C. Thus the expected net payoff function, equation (1.3), 
becomes 
 𝑐𝑖 − (1 − 𝛷 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚))) 𝜌 + (𝛷 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚)))𝜇                                 (1.10) 
So, as long as 𝐸𝐵(𝜃, 𝑐) = 𝑐𝑖 we can declare that an equilibrium exists. To do the 
remaining proof I will write 𝐸𝐵(𝜃, 𝑐) as (1 − 𝛷 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚))) 𝜌 + (𝛷 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚))) 𝜇. 
Now to find the fixed point of Γ(x), it is enough to find the point(s) where 𝐸𝐵()  =  𝑐. To do 
this, let us consider the shape of 𝐸𝐵(). I will first show that 𝐸𝐵() is increasing in θ. By 
differentiating and rearranging we find that equation (4) is increasing in θ  if and only if 
𝐴 ≤
1 − 𝛷 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚))
𝜃𝜙 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚))
                                                   (1.11) 
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and decreasing otherwise. Thus, we can prove that 𝐸𝐵() is single peaked by showing that there 
exists a θ for which equation (1.11) is true thereby making 𝐸𝐵() increasing, and by showing 
there exists a θ for which equation (1.11) is false which would make 𝐸𝐵() decreasing. First, let 
us consider lim𝜃→0 𝐸𝐵(), notice that the numerator will be some positive number whereas the 
denominator will approach 0. Thus, lim𝜃→0 𝐸𝐵() = ∞1, which implies that there is a value of θ 
for which 𝐸𝐵() is increasing. 





1 − 𝛷 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚))




1 − 𝛷 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚))
𝜃𝜙 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚))
 = lim
𝜃→∞
−𝜙 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚)) 𝑓𝜃(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚)




−𝜙 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚)) 𝑓𝜃(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚)
𝜙 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚)) + 𝜃𝜙′ (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?,𝑚)) 𝑓𝜃(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚)
= lim
𝜃→∞
−𝜙 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚)) 𝑓𝜃(𝜃, ?̂?,𝑚)
𝜙 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚)) + 𝜃 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚))𝜙′ (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚)) 𝑓𝜃(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚)
   
 lim
𝜃→∞
−𝜙 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚)) 𝑓𝜃(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚)
𝜙 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚)) + 𝜃 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚))𝜙′ (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚)) 𝑓𝜃(?̂?, ?̂?, 𝑚)
 =  lim
𝜃→∞
𝑓𝜃(?̂?, ?̂?, 𝑚)
𝜃 (𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?, 𝑚)) 𝑓𝜃(?̂?, ?̂?, 𝑚)
 
Finally, notice that this value is 0 since the numerator is a constant but that the 
denominator increases as θ increases. Thus, there exists a θ for which 𝐸𝐵() is decreasing. 
Therefore, 𝐸𝐵() is single peaked. 
Similarly, by differentiating and rearranging, we find that 𝐸𝐵() is decreasing in c if and 
only if B ≥ 0, which is always true. This result comes from the definition of B above. Therefore, 
we see that 𝐸𝐵() is single peaked and continuous. From this we determine that an equilibrium 
exists as long as 𝐸𝐵() equals 𝑐𝑖. This implies that the height of the peak will alter the number of 
equilibria that exist. 
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If the maximum value of 𝐸𝐵() falls below𝑐𝑖, then an equilibrium in which a revolution 
occurs does not exist. If the maximum value is exactly 𝑐𝑖 then there is only one equilibrium with 
successful revolution. Finally, if the maximum value is greater than 𝑐𝑖 then there are two 
equilibria in which there is a nonzero probability of revolting. Thus, an equilibrium exists, but 
the exact number depends on the maximum value of 𝐸𝐵(). ∎  
 
Figure 1.1 below shows a graphical representation of 𝐸𝐵(), as in Bueno de Mesquita 
(2014) the curve is single peaked. 
 
          Figure 1.1 
 
I will now focus on the situation in which there are three equilibria, one with zero 
participation and two with nonzero participation. Let 𝑥∞ define the equilibrium with no 
participation. Furthermore, let the equilibria with nonzero participation be defined by 𝑥𝐿and 𝑥𝐻  






Theorem 3. The equilibrium defined by 𝑥𝐿 is stable, but the one defined by 𝑥𝐻  is unstable. 
Proof. Since the equilibria of the game are symmetric we can say that Γ(x) intersects the 
45 degree line at 𝑥𝐿and 𝑥𝐻  . In particular Γ(x) crosses the 45 degree line from below at 
𝑥𝐿 and from above at 𝑥𝐻  . Therefore |
𝑑
𝑑𝑥
𝛤(𝑥𝐿)| < 1 and |
𝑑
𝑑𝑥
𝛤(𝑥𝐻)| > 1 ∎ 
 
For the rest of the paper I will assume that players will not end up at 𝑥𝐻 because of the 
previous result. 
I will now determine the effort that the extremist party will choose in equilibria. I begin 
by considering the equilibrium defined by an infinite cutoff point. Recall that x = ∞ implies that 
there is no participation from the population. Because of this, the extremist will choose to use 
minimum effort, that is, 𝑒 =  0. This can easily be seen by considering the extremists payoff, 
𝑢(𝑁) − 𝑓(𝑒). If 𝑥 =  ∞, then nobody chooses to revolt which implies that 𝑁 =  0. Therefore, 
the extremists are now maximizing 𝑢(0) − 𝑓(𝑒) which is achieved when 𝑓(𝑒) is at its minimum. 
By definition, 𝑓(𝑒) is smallest when e is at its lowest possible value. 
Now we consider the stable equilibrium with positive probability of revolting. Again we 
consider the extremist's problem: 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑢(𝑁) − 𝑓(𝑒) choosing the level of effort, e, to produce. 
In order to examine this problem further we must determine the value of N. 
Recall, that N is the number of citizens who are choosing to revolt from our continuum of 
players. By definition, this means that N is also the proportion of players that revolt as the total 
population is normalized to 1. To determine this value, we consider an arbitrary player j . I 
declare that Player j revolts if his or her type is greater than or equal to the cutoff point x that 
defines the equilibrium. That is, Player j revolts if 𝜃𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗 ≥ 𝑥 . Using the definitions of 𝜃𝑗  and 𝑐𝑗 
we know Player j will revolt if 
13 
 
𝛩 + 𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗 ≥ 𝑥                                                                  (1.12) 
Now if all players use cutoff point x, which is true in equilibrium, then N is simply the 
proportion of players for which equation (1.12) is true. 
Thus, 
𝑁 = 1 − 𝛷
𝑥 − ?̅? + 𝑐𝑖
√𝜎𝛩
2 + 𝜎2
                                                            (1.13) 





) − 𝑓(𝑒). Since I assumed 
that players will not reach 𝑥𝐻, I can now simplify the extremists problem. Since we are only 
considering equilibria at this moment, it is important to note that in equilibrium the players' 
belief about the effort exerted by the extremist is correct. That is, 𝑒 =  𝑒 ∗. I previously showed 
that the extremist chooses 𝑒 =  0 in the equilibrium defined by 𝑥∞. Similarly, in the equilibrium 
defined by 𝑥𝐿  the extremist chooses to exert level of effort 𝑒 =  𝑒 ∗, with 𝑒 ∗ >  0. 
 
Comparative Statics 
I first consider the equilibrium 𝑥𝐿 from the above model. I will now show that the cutoff 
point x which defines the equilibrium is increasing in ρ, the payoff reserved for players who help 
in the regime overthrow. I will also show later, that in the event of a fixed 𝑐𝑖, the equilibrium is 







Theorem 4: The equilibrium cutoff point is increasing in ρ. 
Proof. Consider the best response function, equation (1.7), at 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿  which defines an 
equilibrium. The comparative statics can be found by differentiating with respect to the 
parameter of interest. 
𝛿
𝛿𝜌




)) > 0 
This inequality is true because 0 ≤ 1 – Φ ≤ 1 by definition and 𝜃𝑖 ≥ 0 in equilibrium as 
was previously shown.∎ 
 
Let us now consider the probability that a revolution will actually occur. We know this 
will happen as long as 𝑁 ≥ 0. Essentially, we want to know what is Pr (𝑁 ≥ 0). First, I will 
define N, the number of people who revolt. 
𝑁 = Pr (𝛩 + 𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 ≥ 𝑥) 
Which can be rewritten as 
𝑁 = (1 − 𝛷 (




Therefore the probability that a revolution occurs is equivalent to the proportion of the 
population for which 𝑁 ≥ 0. So 
𝑃𝑟 (1 − 𝛷 (
𝑥 − ?̅? + 𝑐𝑖
√𝜎2 + 𝜎𝛩
2
)) ≥ 0 
















                                                   (1.14) 
Where 𝜎2 is the variance of N. Equation (1.14) is represents the probability that a 
revolution will be successful. As long as (1.14) is not equal to 0 a revolt has the potential to be 
successful regardless of the number of participants, this supports the findings of Schelling (1960) 
and Hardin (1996) on spontaneous revolution.  
An interesting implication of this model, that seems to contradict most research on the 
topic of regime change, is that the extremist in this model does not convince a population to 
revolt. In fact, if we are in equilibrium, the effort that the extremist spends on their message, e, is 
equal to the level of effort that the population believes they have exerted, e*. This means that, on 
the average, the players correctly guess the value of e. One might argue that an extremist is only 
present in those countries which experience an overthrown regime. However, according to this 
model, the presence of an extremist solely represents that the country is ripe to revolution. This 
can be seen because an extremist will only choose a nonzero amount of effort in the equilibrium 
𝑥𝐿. If, instead, the country is in the equilibrium represented by 𝑥∞ then the extremist will choose 
to produce effort 𝑒 =  0. This means that only those countries that have a nonzero probability of 
revolution will have an active extremist. Essentially, an extremist will only choose to send a 
message to the population if they can influence the decision and since this only happens in the 






Application: Common Knowledge Cost 
Consider a situation in which the cost of revolting is a fixed value and that it is common 
knowledge for all players. I will represent this by setting 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐 for all i, where 𝑐 >  0 is an 
arbitrary constant. By doing this, I create a model related to the one considered above, in which 
the players only have one type, their anti-government sentiment, similar to the model presented 
by Bueno de Mesquita (2010). As before, we have a continuum of players choosing between 
actions 𝑎1 and 𝑎0. We also set cost equal to a constant,  𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐. The status quo payoff remains 
equal to value s as before. This application considers the scenario in which only anti-government 
sentiment is player dependent and cost is the same for all players. This results in the following 
model: 
  𝑃−𝑖 
  𝑁 ≥ 𝑇 𝑁 < 𝑇 
𝑃𝑖 𝑎1 𝜃𝑖 − 𝑐 𝑠 − 𝑐 
𝑎0 (1 − 𝛾)𝜃𝑖 𝑠 
 
In this application, player's types are only the anti-government sentiment as cost is the 
same for all players. Again, I assume that players will play cutoff strategies in this game. 
As before, players receive their types and then create beliefs about the other players' 
types. In this model, that means player i sees his or her anti-government sentiment, 𝜃𝑖, which is 
still normally distributed as before. After receiving his or her type, player i formulates a belief 
about player j's type. Since, in the introductory model, the formulated beliefs of 𝜃𝑗  are 
independent of a player's cost type, I declare that player i's belief about player j's type remains 
the same as before. The only difference in this application is that player i does not formulate a 
belief about player j's cost type, as that is common knowledge. 
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Next, the extremist chooses the level of violence to display which then leads the players 
to re-update beliefs further, just as we saw above. Assume for a moment, that player j is using 
cutoff strategy x, in our previous model this meant that he would revolt (play 𝑎1) if 𝜃𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗 ≥ 𝑥, 
and would not revolt (play 𝑎0) otherwise. However, in this application, 𝑐𝑗  is a fixed value. Thus, 
we can simplify this strategy by saying that player j will revolt if 𝜃𝑗 ≥ 𝑥. This means, from 
Player i’s point of view, if arbitrary Player j plays with cutoff point x,  the probability that Player 
j revolts is Pr(𝜃𝑗 ≥ 𝑥). Given Player i‘s beliefs about Player j’s type, Pr(𝜃𝑗 ≥ 𝑥) = 1 − 𝜙(𝑥 −
?̿?). As before, we can use this probability to define the proportion of the population that will 
revolt. This further implies that, given a cutoff point x for Player -i, Player i’s best response is 
𝛤(𝑥) = 𝜃𝑖 + 𝑐 − 𝛾𝜃𝑖 (1 − 𝜙(𝑥 − ?̿?)).  The fixed point of Γ(x) is the equilibrium in this example 
which was proven to exist earlier. 
The extremist present in this model behaves strictly as a player who wants to see the 
revolution occur, and tries to persuade the other players into revolting, by sending a message 
about the value of the population's anti-government sentiment. In this example, the extremist's 
payoff depends on whether or not a revolution occurs. That is, 𝑢(𝑁 ≥ 𝑇) − 1 and 𝑢(𝑁 < 𝑇) = 0 
while still experiencing the costs associated with more effort spent on the message. So, the 
Extremist’s payoffs are: 1 − 𝑓(𝑒) if 𝑁 ≥ 𝑇 and -f(e) if N < T where 𝑓(𝑒) remains the cost 
function of providing effort level e. 
The comparative statics presented previously remain true in this application. The 
equilibrium cutoff point is increasing in γ the reserve benefit for choosing to revolt if the revolt is 
successful (similar to ρ). However, now there is an additional parameter which can impact 
outcomes. It is easy to show that the equilibrium is also decreasing in c. This tells us that a 
government could potentially stifle attempts at a revolution by increasing punishment for players 
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who participated in a failed revolution. This implies an increase in the cost of revolting and 
therefore a reduction in the number of players who choose to revolt. 
 
Application: Uncertain Payoffs 
In this next application, we consider a situation in which the exact value of the benefit of 
a successful revolution is unknown. This represents a more realistic situation than many of the 
other examples, as the precise payoff of a person’s actions may not be entirely realized until after 
the game has finished. Players may not know the exact payoffs that they will receive from 
different outcomes, but they will use all the information available to them to formulate a belief 
about what they will be. 
As before, we have a continuum of players. We also declare that a revolution is 
successful if a proportion of the population greater than or equal to T decides to revolt. We then 
have cost of revolting 𝑐𝑖 equal to a constant c. We also choose a value γ in such a way that 
(1 − 𝛾)𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝑖 − 𝑐. This results in a model which is similar to the one presented by Shadmehr 
and Bernhardt (2011). 
  𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
  𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 
𝑃𝑖 𝑎1 𝜃𝑖 − 𝑐 𝑠 − 𝑐 
𝑎0 𝜃𝑖 − 𝑐 𝑠 
 
In this model, the exact value of 𝜃𝑖 is unknown, which implies that the exact value of 
𝜃𝑖 −c is also unknown. Thus, a player's type is the signal that they receive about the value of 𝜃𝑖. 
The players observe this value and then formulate beliefs about the other player's types as 
described above. Using these beliefs, they then play a cutoff strategy as was previously defined. 
The uncertainty of the payoffs causes this game to exhibits both games of strategic complements 
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and games of strategic substitutes. This can be seen from the shape of the expected net payoff 
function. The function is single peaked which implies that for cutoff values less than the 
maximum point, players are more likely to revolt if the other player is more likely to revolt. 
However, if the cutoff strategy is to the right of the maximum then players are less likely to 
revolt if the other player is more likely to revolt. It can be explained intuitively as follows: If 
Player i is willing to revolt even when receiving a poor signal, then player j is less likely to revolt 
since he or she begins to doubt the actual value of a successful revolution. 
 
Application: Pro-government Extremist 
 Now we consider the situation in which the extremist instead wants to see the current 
regime stay in power. This is represented by a simple change in which the extremist’s message 
becomes  𝑚(𝛩, 𝑒) =  𝛩 − 𝑒 + 𝜂. Instead of adding the value of the effort, it is subtracted from 
the populations’ anti-government sentiment, Θ, along with some noise. This implies that the 
value of m is now lower. This impacts ?̿̅? by lowering its value relative to the previous model. 
Thus, each player now views society as having a lower anti-government sentiment. This, in 
response will decrease the value of ?̿̅?  in equation (9), which defines an equilibrium cutoff point. 
The lower value of ?̿̅? increases the numerator thereby increasing the argument inside the normal 
CDF.  Thus the ρ component of equation (9) is now smaller, but the μ component is bigger.  








𝑥 − ?̿̅? + 𝑐𝑖
√𝜎2
2
) < 0 
Thus, when ?̿̅? decreases, the cutoff point also decreases, thereby causing more of the 







As seen above, the model presented in this paper has several useful applications to real 
world scenarios. Some possible additions to the literature would be adding the government as a 
player and having them try to quell the revolutionaries by giving additional signals to the 
population. In this situation, one could investigate the possibility that the government can 
successfully threaten the citizen; would a threat be enough or would they have to follow through 
with these threats? One could also generalize the model further by having arbitrary distributions 








No Child Left Behind (NCLB) was signed into law by George W. Bush on January 8
th
 
2002. The law’s purpose was to increase student achievement. A particular emphasis was made 
on reducing the achievement gap between high-performing and low-performing schools. The law 
attempted to accomplish this goal by striving to make every student proficient in math and 
reading as measured by a standardized test. Any school that did not show the necessary 
improvements in proficiency between years would have sanctions placed on them. These 
sanctions ranged from a warning for the first year a school did not reach the required level of 
proficiency, all the way to complete government takeover of the school if it failed to reach the 
required level for six consecutive years. Although state-level accountability systems did exist 
prior to NCLB, this type of federal accountability system had never been seen before in 
elementary and secondary schools in the U.S. This was a fundamental change in the field of 
education and as such could have a direct impact on teachers. The way that teachers respond to 
this type of accountability system directly impacts the achievement of students since any kind of 
turnover negatively affects a student’s test scores (Hanushek, Rivkin, and Schiman 2016). 
The academic gains made by students under NCLB have been largely positive. Initial 
reports including Rouse et al (2007) and Rockoff and Turner (2008) found that NCLB achieved 
its goal by increasing test scores in target schools and target areas by anywhere between 0.04 and 
0.2 standard deviations. This is a modest effect in absolute terms, but does represent about 7% of 
the effect witnessed between students having a mother who is a high school graduate versus a 
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high school dropout as seen in Dahl and Lochner (2012)
1
. Ballou and Springer (2011) and Dee 
and Jacobs (2011) also find that NCLB does have a positive impact on student achievement, 
particularly in math. While most research involving NCLB has been rightly focused on academic 
achievement, there is surprisingly very little inquiry into the impact it has had on school 
personnel. It is intuitive that an accountability system as extreme and pervasive as NCLB would 
have some sort of effect on teachers as well as students. The papers that do study teachers focus 
on how teachers responded to NCLB and how they approach teaching under an accountability 
system. Manna (2011) finds that teachers changed the way they teach following NCLB. Several 
papers also consider how NCLB changes the way teachers approach the field, such as spending 
more time on tested subjects (math and reading) as found by Dee, Jacobs, and Schwartz (2013), 
searching for better or more efficient teaching styles as in Murnane and Papay (2010), or even to 
teach to the test (Jacob 2005; Figlio and Rouse 2006).
2
 
There is minimal research on how teachers are responding to accountability systems, 
such as NCLB. One, possibly unintentional, impact of this type of reform, on teachers is a 
change in teachers’ job satisfaction. Barksdale-Ladd (2000) and Hoffman, Assaf, and Paris 
(2001) find that, under an accountability system, teachers feel more pressure to deliver high test 
scores. Cavanaugh (2012), Gerson (2007), and Toppo (2007) all find that accountability systems 
increase pressure which leads to teacher stress. Others also find that teachers feel a reduction in 
job security (Finnigan and Gross 2007, Luna and Turner 2001, Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, and 
Harrington 2014). This pressure felt by teachers is amplified when considering teachers at 
schools that are at or below Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP), (Reback et al. 2014). If teachers 
                                                          
1
 They find that students whose mothers are high school graduates had test scores that were 17% of a standard 
deviation higher than students whose mothers were high school dropouts. 
2
 This happens when the curriculum being taught is heavily focused on only preparing the students for what they 
will see on a standardized test. This type of teaching is thought to lack passion and meaning, and can even be 
considered unethical by some as it is not an accurate representation of the abilities of the teacher. 
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are feeling more pressure, less job security, or generally less job satisfaction, then it is likely that 
more teachers will leave the field. This is valuable since most research shows that teacher 
turnover has a negative effect on students’ learning (Ronfeldt, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2013); and 
Hanushek, Rivkin, and Schiman (2016)). 
Sun, Saultz, and Ye (2014) use pre-NCLB and post-NCLB data to study teacher attrition 
caused by NCLB, but ignore the staggered introduction of accountability systems in states with a 
prior policy. Several states had a statewide accountability system in place before NCLB. The 
assumption used in the literature is that states with a prior accountability system are not affected 
or treated by NCLB because the federal government used the existing systems as guides when 
they drafted NCLB. However, the 26 states that had some prior form of an accountability system 
before 2002 experienced different implementation years of these programs. This means that the 
states with a prior system were “treated” during different years. I account for this staggered 
introduction of accountability systems. 
This paper will fill the gap in the literature by answering three questions:  1) How are 
teachers responding to NCLB? In particular, why are teachers reacting this way to NCLB and 
which subset of the teaching population is the driving force behind these changes? 2) Can we 
generalize these changes observed in NCLB and compare them to the effects observed from state 
level accountability systems that were introduced prior to 2002? Is there a difference between 
NCLB and these previous systems? 3) Is NCLB changing who chooses to become a teacher? 
What effect does NCLB have on the demographic information of college graduates with degrees 
in education? 
The rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section I introduce a theoretical model that 
is representative of an individual teacher who has been affected by NCLB. I then describe the 
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data sources and explain the methodology used in the paper. Following that I look at the results 
obtained from my analysis and discuss the results. Finally, I conclude. 
 
Theoretical Model 
The following section introduces the theoretical model I will use to explain a teacher’s 
earnings. I will then use this model to determine how changes in environment or experience can 
influence a teacher’s likelihood to remain teaching. To do this, I introduce an accountability 
system into the model by adding a wage shock to the teacher. Using this shock I am able to 
compare how the likelihood of staying in the field changed after the shock was introduced. 
Consider a model in which workers are trying to maximize their utility. Since utility is a 
monotonic transformation of wage, I consider the natural logarithm of the individual’s wage that 
they are currently earning which is given by the following equation: 
𝑤𝑖 =  𝛼𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑆𝑗 + 𝜏𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑖𝑗 +                                                      (2.1) 
where 𝑡𝑖𝑗 is worker i’s tenure at job j, 𝑆𝑗 represents the environmental effects of job j, 𝑋𝑖 is a 
vector of worker characteristics. Thus wage is a function of an individual’s tenure at their current 
job, as well as where they work and any individual characteristics that are important (Topel and 
Ward 1992). Finally, ℎ𝑖𝑗 is a measure of worker-job match. That is, ℎ𝑖𝑗 measures worker i’s 
aptitude for job j. Note that ℎ𝑖𝑗  is not a simple measure of ability, but rather a measure of the 
quality of the match between the worker and the job (Jovanovic 1979).   Finally, ε is the error 
term with E[ε] = 0. A worker’s wage increases in tenure, experience as measured in 𝑋𝑖 because 
the workers gain general skills as well as specific skills through on the job training (Neal 1995, 
Parent 2000). Note that a higher aptitude for a particular job leads to higher wages. This 
represents the fact that the worker is more productive and is compensated for that higher 
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production. Additionally, the product ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑖𝑗 shows that a more productive worker benefits more 
from more experience than less productive workers. 
Assume that a teacher with characteristics X is employed at a school with firm effect S’. 
The teacher has a worker job match of h’ and therefore is earning a wage of  
𝑤 = 𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ + 𝛽𝑆
′ + 𝜏𝑋′ + 𝛾ℎ′𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ +                                                       (2.2) 
We will compare this to an industry job with firm effect Ŝ and a worker-job match of ĥ which 
will have wage  
𝑤 = 𝛼𝑡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽Ŝ + 𝜏𝑋
′ + 𝛾ĥ𝑡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 +                                                        (2.3) 
Additionally assume that all workers are employed for N years before retiring so in the model t ϵ 
[0,N]. Now assume that at time t=T there is wage shock experienced by the teacher, such as the 
introduction of an accountability system, which affects the worker-job match. We will represent 
this by shifting the value of the current worker- job match, h, by the value of the shock, v.  
So the teacher’s new wage becomes  
𝑤 = 𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ + 𝛽𝑆
′ + 𝜏𝑋′ + 𝛾(ℎ + 𝑣)𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ +                                                 (2.4) 
Notice that the shock has a greater magnitude on longer tenured teachers. 
Following this shock, a teacher can choose to remain in the field and earn their post-shock wage 
or they can leave the field and become employed at a different job to avoid the effect of the 
shock. So we can now compare all the possible wages available to this teacher. 
𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ + 𝛽𝑆
′ + 𝜏𝑋′ + 𝛾ℎ′𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ +                                      (2.5) 
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ + 𝛽𝑆
′ + 𝜏𝑋′ + 𝛾(ℎ′ + 𝑣)𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ +                      (2.6) 
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛼𝑡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽Ŝ + 𝜏𝑋
′ + 𝛾ĥ𝑡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 +                                     (2.7) 
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So, if a wage shock occurs, a teacher’s decision can be simplified to choosing whether to stay in 




Figure 1: Left of T shows log wage of a teacher before the wage shock takes place. Right of T shows their decision 
after it occurs, continue teaching and earn log wage measured by U(stay) or leave teaching and earn log wage 
U(leave). 
 
We can say that lifetime utility for a teacher who remains in the field is given by: 
𝑈(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦) = ∑ 𝛿𝑡(𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ + 𝛽𝑆
′ + 𝜏𝑋′ + 𝛾ℎ′𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ + )
𝑇
𝑡=0 + ∑ 𝛿
𝑡(𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ + 𝛽𝑆
′ + 𝜏𝑋′ + 𝛾(ℎ′ + 𝑣)𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ + )
𝑁
𝑡=𝑇        (2.8) 
 
Figure 2.1: Lifetime Utility Following a Wage Shock 
                                            T                                           N 














Whereas the lifetime utility for a teacher who leaves and becomes employed elsewhere is 
given by: 
𝑈(𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒) = ∑ 𝛿𝑡(𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ + 𝛽𝑆
′ + 𝜏𝑋′ + 𝛾ℎ′𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ +
𝑇
𝑡=0 ) + ∑ 𝛿
𝑡(𝛼𝑡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽𝑆
′ + 𝜏𝑋′ + 𝛾ℎ′𝑡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 +
𝑁
𝑡=𝑇 )              (2.9) 
Which means a teacher only needs to consider the net change in lifetime utility by 
leaving the field, which is given by: 
𝑈(𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒) = 𝑈(𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒) − 𝑈(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦)
=∑𝛿𝑡(𝛼𝑡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽Ŝ + 𝜏𝑋
′ + 𝛾ĥ𝑡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 +
𝑁
𝑡=𝑇
− ∑𝛿𝑡(𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ + 𝛽𝑆




If this equation is greater than 0, then the teacher gets more utility from leaving the 
profession, but if it is negative then the teacher will remain in the field. If it is equal to 0 then we 
will assume that the teacher will stay. 




)𝛿𝑁−𝑇(𝛼(𝑁 − 𝑇) + 2𝛽Ŝ + 2𝜏𝑋′ + 𝛾ĥ(𝑁 − 𝑇) − 𝛼(𝑁 + 𝑇) − 2𝛽𝑆′ − 𝑠𝜏𝑋′ − 𝛾(ℎ′ + 𝑣)(𝑁 + 𝑇))   (2.11) 




)(−𝛿𝑁𝛼𝑇 − 𝛿𝑇𝛼𝑇 + 𝛿𝑁𝛽(Ŝ − 𝑆′) + 𝛿𝑇𝛽(Ŝ − 𝑆′) + 𝛿𝑁𝛾(ĥ(𝑁 − 𝑇) − (ℎ′ + 𝑣)(𝛿𝑁𝑁 + 𝛿𝑇𝑇))      (2.12) 






























) (−𝛿𝑁𝛾𝑁 − 𝛿𝑇𝛾𝑇) ≤  0 
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Here we see that as S’, the schools environment, increases then the net utility from 
leaving decreases. This is also true if h’, the worker-job match for teaching, increases. However, 
if either Ŝ, the environment for the other profession, or ĥ, the worker-job match for the non-
teaching profession, increases then the net utility from leaving also increases which makes it 
more likely that the individual will leave. Finally, if the value of v, the utility shock, increases 
then the individual is more likely to remain in teaching. 
Using this model, I will test to determine what effect an accountability system has on the 
likelihood of leaving. Additionally, we can test to see if an increase in teacher aptitude makes an 
individual more likely to stay in the field. Since, job-worker match is hard to measure, we can 
instead use a measure of happiness as a proxy. We can test the effect work environment has on a 
teacher’s decision to stay. To do this, I can look at a teacher’s satisfaction with their current 
school and stratify my results along those findings.  
 
Data and Methods 
I use three waves of the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) to combine cross-sectional 
time series data on teachers and schools. SASS is a nationally representative survey of schools 
and school personnel issued by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). I pair these 
three waves with the corresponding waves of the Teacher Follow-Up Survey (TFS) which is also 
issued by NCES. The SASS waves that I use contain information during the 1993-1994, 1999-
2000, and 2007-2008 school years. While the TFS waves I use are issued sometime during the 
following year, 1994-1995, 2000-2001, and 2008-2009. Since NCLB was signed into law in 
January of 2002, I have two pre-NCLB waves, the 1993-94 and 1999-2000 school years, and one 
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post-NCLB wave, the 2007-08 school year. This differs from the current literature since I am 
only using one post-NCLB wave.  
As Reback, Rockoff, and Schwartz (2014) showed, states had some control over how to 
implement NCLB. A state had to submit its own guidelines to the government which then had to 
be approved under the NCLB guidelines. This meant that a state’s personal plan had to be 
approved by the federal government. This approval process would have caused a delay in when 
NCLB was implemented among states. Therefore, while NCLB was passed in 2002 and 
theoretically would have gone into effect during the 2002-2003 school year, it is ambiguous as to 
whether or not a state would have experienced any effects from NCLB until much later. Thus, I 
am omitting the SASS data for the 2003-2004 school year. Many other papers such as Dee and 
Jacobs (2011), Sun, Saultz, and Ye (2014), and Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, and Harrington 
(2014) use all four waves. I believe this is a mistake because any change in turnover during this 
time period would not be caused by the accountability system itself, but instead the future 
expectations of the system being in place. More recent waves of the SASS are available, such as 
the 2011-2012 wave, but I chose not to use them just as Sun, Saultz, and Ye (2014) chose not to 
use them, as any teacher turnover post-2008 could be strongly influenced by the Great Recession 
making it difficult to separate any effects of NCLB from those caused by the recession. 
 However, this concern does not apply to the 2007-2009 SASS and TFS waves since the 
recession began in 2008 after the SASS survey was completed and any decision to stay or leave 
the profession was already made at that point and likely not influenced by the Great Recession 
(Hyatt and McEntarfer 2012). 
 I remove private school teachers from the dataset as they were not affected by NCLB. 
While it is true that some private schools chose to follow NCLB guidelines (Christensen et. al. 
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2007), it is impossible to know which ones from the SASS datasets. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
know whether or not any sanctions were placed on any private schools that did not meet 
Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) or if the schools just wanted to see where they stood in relation 
to other schools.
3
 Finally, I removed observations from my dataset if their contract was not 
renewed by the school as I want to view how NCLB affected voluntary attrition and so I only 
want to consider the individuals who chose to leave the field of teaching during this timeframe. 
Figure 2.2 shows the timing of the SASS and TFS and how each individual teacher is labeled 
once they respond to the TFS. 
 
Figure 2.2: SASS-TFS Wave for school year t-t+1 




All teachers in sample. 
Stayers: continuing to teach 
in the TFS 
Leavers: Anybody not 
teaching in the TFS. 
(Contains retirees, terminated, 
and voluntary leavers) 
 
  
The method I use in this paper is similar to the method found in Dee and Jacobs (2011) and Sun, 
Saultz, and Ye (2014), a difference-in-differences model to determine the effect of not only 
NCLB, but state-level teacher accountability systems as well. As in Dee and Jacobs (2011) as 
well as Sun, Saultz, and Ye (2014), I consider a model in which a comparison is made between a 
“treatment group,” consisting of states that had no accountability system prior to NCLB, and a 
“comparison group” made up of states that had some form of an accountability policy before 
NCLB. As Sun, Saultz, and Ye (2014) explain, the premise of this strategy is that NCLB was 
                                                          
3
 I do include the private teachers as a robustness check later in the paper. 
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modeled after the accountability systems that existed in states such as Texas, Tennessee, and 
North Carolina. From 1990 to 2000, 26 states formed their own accountability systems for 
teachers. The federal government then used these programs as a basis for NCLB (Murnane and 
Papay 2010). I use the dating method used by Dee and Jacobs (2011) which is presented in 
Appendix Figure 2.1. The basic idea in the model is that states that transitioned from a previous 
accountability system to NCLB would not experience any effects as they are already “treated” by 
the previous program. However, the 24 states that did not have any prior system will be truly 




I use a linear probability model as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑠 ∗ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅) + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑗𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑠𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡    (2.13) 
The model looks at the likelihood of teacher i in school j in state s during year t 
remaining in the field of teaching following that year.  The dependent variable is a dummy which 










Figure 2.3: The Effect of Accountability Systems on 
Teacher Retention 




indicator which is equal to 1 if the year is post-introduction of an accountability system in that 
state. I also control for year fixed effects, YEAR, as well as individual teacher characteristics, 
Xijst, school characteristics, Sjst, and state fixed effects, STATEst. 
 I also use this model to consider the effect that any previous accountability systems had 
on teacher turnover. In the 1993-1994 wave of SASS, only 2 states had some kind of 
accountability system in place (Illinois and Wisconsin). However, by the next SASS wave in 
1999-2000, that number had risen to 26. Therefore, we can use a difference-in-differences model 
to find the effect that these accountability programs had on these 24 states. 
 
Results  
Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics for teachers during all years of the survey. I further 
separate teachers between leavers and stayers. Notice that the teachers that choose to stay during 
these 3 waves are on average 6 years younger than those that leave and have nearly 6 fewer years 
of experience. The percentage of private school teachers, Asian teachers, black teachers, 
Hispanic teachers, and Native American teachers largely does not vary between stayers and 
leavers.  Finally notice that leavers are less likely to have a bachelor’s degree, but more likely to 
have a master’s degree. This seems to imply that teachers from both ends of the education 
spectrum are leaving the field. 
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Table 2.1. Summary Statistics 




    
Age 40.5 38.4 44.6 
Experience 11.7 9.7 15.6 
Private 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Native 
American 
0.018 0.017 0.021 
Asian 0.026 0.026 0.026 
Black 0.066 0.068 0.062 
Hispanic 0.05 0.054 0.042 
Female 0.72 0.74 0.70 
Union 0.53 0.53 0.53 
Salary 33,470 33,226 33,941 
Bachelors 0.97 0.98 0.95 
Masters 0.38 0.35 0.44 
Stay 0.66 1 0 
N 25,210 16,610 8,600 
    
 
Table 2.2 shows how selected variables differ among teachers across years and across the 
teacher’s leave status. The average age of stayers steadily decreases over time while the age of 
leavers doesn’t follow any noticeable pattern. Average total experience of stayers remains 
relatively constant prior to NCLB but drops significantly afterward. By pairing this decrease in 
experience with the increase in retirement rates among leavers, it seems as if NCLB could be 
pushing some teachers out of the field. The percentage of non-white stayers also rises over time. 
Finally, the percentage of teachers that have a bachelors and the percentage that have a masters 




Table 2.2. Teacher by Year by Status 













       
Age 38.5 38.2 36.7 45.1 44.1 44.9 
Experience 9.7 9.8 7.7 15.9 15.8 15.5 
Private 0.30 0.27 0.15 0.25 0.20 0.24 
Native 
American 
0.013 0.014 0.016 0.021 0.021 0.019 
Asian 0.019 0.021 0.026 0.020 0.025 0.023 
Black 0.052 0.061 0.070 0.050 0.054 0.071 
Hispanic 0.050 0.058 0.063 0.036 0.042 0.049 
Female 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.66 0.68 0.75 
Union 0.56 0.48 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.54 
Salary 26,099 31,506 39,401 28,195 33,618 41,914 
Bachelors 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Masters 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.44 0.45 0.47 
N 3,970 4,380 3,480 2,310 2,370 1,260 
       
 
Table 2.3 shows the results from the simple model in which we do not control for any 
individual or school characteristics. This table shows the impact of NCLB on turnover between 
the 1999-2000 and 2007-2008 schools years. The reform effect for the 2007-2008 school year is 
positive and significant. It appears that any prior accountability system does not affect teacher 
turnover, but NCLB increases the likelihood of staying by over 5 percentage points.  
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      Table 2.3: Effect of Federal 










Number of state 50 
Year FE YES 
State FE YES 
  
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Below, I include a graphical representation of the average age and experience of teachers 
over time. These results can be found in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 respectively. In both age and 
total experience there is a sharp decline in stayers after 2003-04. However, among leavers, the 
average age and experience is slightly increased following the signing of NCLB. The effect on 
age and experience after a state-level accountability system appears to be nonexistent. These 
descriptive statistics seem to suggest that teachers are reacting to NCLB by leaving the field 
which allows for new teachers to take their place thereby lowering the average age and 
experience significantly, which contradicts the findings of the model in Table 2.3. This type of 
result is possible because the sheer number of teachers in field increased following NCLB. The 
average student to teacher ratio for the United States fell during my time frame, 17.3 in 1995 to 
15.3 in 2008
4
, which suggests that there are more teachers overall after NCLB was passed. If 
                                                          
4




most of these new teachers were younger individuals with little experience it allows the previous 
figures and the effects found in Table 2.3 to be true. 
 




Accepting the results found in the tables and figures above, it appears teachers are more 
likely to remain in the field following a national accountability system such as NCLB, even 
though the media suggests that NCLB is largely viewed as unpopular. Following the typology 
suggested by Perrow (1972) this would lead to more variety and higher analyzability among 
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field of education becomes less craft-like and more engineering-like which causes a shift in what 
is expected of teachers. This shift makes teaching more structured and mechanical and thereby 
will chase few teachers away even if they dislike the changes.  
The next question to answer is whether or not different subgroups are affected differently. 
I first look at whether NCLB affects male teachers and female teachers differently. The results 
are in Table 2.4. 
 
Table 2.4: Effect of NCLB on Staying 
Stratified by Sex 






    
Type of reform Federal Federal Federal 
    
Reform 0.0468** 0.0353 0.0115 
 (0.0226) (0.0360) (0.0425) 
    
Observations 5,780 2,270  
Number of state 50 50  
Year FE YES YES  
State FE YES YES  
 
OLS with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in the 
Teacher Follow-up Survey. The results are stratified by gender. Column 3 shows a difference in mean test for the 2 
columns it follows. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Columns 1 and 2 show the models where I use the 1999-2000 and 2007-2008 school 
years. These results show the effect of NCLB. Female teachers experience a slightly smaller but 
more significant effect of NCLB whereas males experience a larger but less significant effect. 





Table 2.5: Effect of NCLB on Staying by Education Level 






    
Type of reform Federal Federal  
    
Reform 0.0864*** 0.00236 0.0840** 
 (0.0235) (0.0332) (0.0407) 
    
Observations 4,820 3,120  
Number of state 50 50  
Year FE YES YES  
State FE YES YES  
 
OLS with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher was still teaching in the 
Teacher Follow-up Survey. The results are stratified by education level. I dropped the teachers with no Bachelor’s. 
Column 3 shows the results of a difference in mean test for the 2 columns it follows. Standard errors are clustered at 
the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
I then test how teachers react to accountability systems based on the level of education 
they have. I am dropping the 5% of teachers who did not have either a Bachelor’s or a Master’s 
degree. Interestingly, the effect of NCLB is large, positive, and significant on teachers who 
solely have a bachelor’s degree as seen in column 1. This effect disappears once a teacher earns a 
master’s degree represented in column 2. This is most likely explained by the fact that after 
receiving a master’s degree, the teacher has more job opportunities available to them and can 
pursue a different career.  
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Type of Reform Federal Federal Federal 
    
Reform 0.0743** 0.0522 0.0410 
 (0.0375) (0.0354) (0.0293) 
    
Observations 1,370 2,370 3,890 
Number of state 50 50 50 
Year FE YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES 
 OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching 
in the Teacher Follow-up Survey. The federal reform is NCLB. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
I then consider whether or not teachers respond to accountability systems differently 
depending on their age. Columns 1 through 3 show the impact that a federal level accountability 
system, such as NCLB has on the likelihood of various age groups remaining in the field. NCLB 
has a significant effect on those teachers who are less than 25 years old, but no significant effect 




Table 2.7: Effect of NCLB on Staying by Experience 
 (1) (2) (3) 









    
Type of Reform Federal Federal Federal 
    
Reform 0.0562** 0.0310 0.0454 
 (0.0255) (0.0381) (0.0499) 
    
Observations 3,180 2,500 1,570 
Number of state 50 50 50 
Year FE YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES 
    
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. The federal reform is NCLB. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
In Table 2.7 I show how the effect of an accountability system is impacted by a teacher’s 
experience. Columns 1 through 3 show the impact that a federal reform, or NCLB, has on a 
teacher’s likelihood of staying stratified along experience. Column 1 shows new teachers with 
less than 3 years of experience, column 2 shows the effect on teachers with 3-15 years of 
experience, and column 6 shows the effect on teachers with more than 15 years of experience. 
NCLB has a positive and significant effect for new teachers. This impact disappears as the 
individual gains more experience. This suggests that teachers are more likely to stay in the field 
following NCLB if they began teaching after it was enacted, since fewer than 3 years of 
experience during the 2007-2008 school year would imply that the teacher, more than likely, 




Table 2.8: Effect of NCLB on Staying by Year 
of Bachelor’s Degree 






    
Type of reform Federal Federal  
    
Reform 0.0291 0.299*** 0.270*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0838) (0.0875) 
Observations 6,420 1,640  
Number of state 50 50  
State FE YES YES  
Year FE YES YES  
    
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still 
teaching in the Teacher Follow-up Survey. The federal reform is NCLB. Column 3 shows the results of a difference 
mean test for the 2 column it follows. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
I test this result by stratifying according to the year that a teacher earned their bachelor’s 
degree. I split them into 2 groups: teachers who earned their degree before the accountability 
system was passed and those who earned their degree after. The results are in Table 2.8. Column 
1 shows the effect of NCLB on those teachers who earned their degree before 2002, when NCLB 
was signed into law. Column 2 shows the effect for those who earned a Bachelor’s degree after 
2002. A teacher who earned their degree before NCLB took effect was not significantly 
impacted by the reform. However, teachers who worked in states that were first affected by 
NCLB were more likely to stay in the field if they earned their degree after 2002 when NCLB 
was signed into law. Column 3 shows that the difference between the two groups is significant at 
the 0.01% level. 
This can be explained by a self-selection process. Anyone who became a teacher after 
2002 knew that NCLB was signed and that they would have to teach under its laws. Any 
prospective teachers that felt they would not be able to do so, chose to pursue another discipline. 
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This is further emphasized in the survey results as every single teacher surveyed majored in 
education for their Bachelor’s degree. Therefore, there were no individuals who majored in some 
non-education discipline that became teachers. 
 
Table 2.9: Effect of NCLB on Staying by View on Continuing Teaching 
















       
Type of reform Federal Federal Federal State State State 
       
Reform 0.0564*** -0.0369 0.0933 -0.00129 -0.156*** 0.155*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0699) (0.0728) (0.0218) (0.0540) (0.0582) 
       
Observations 6,410 910  1,320 6,350  
Number of state 50 50  50 50  
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  
State FE YES YES  
 
YES YES  
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. A state reform is any state-level accountability system enacted before 2002. The 
federal reform is NCLB. Columns 3 and 6 show the results for a difference in mean test for the 2 columns it follows. 
A teacher’s willingness to teach again is from the survey question “Would you be a teacher again?” Standard errors 
are clustered at the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Now I test all testable hypotheses from my model in section II. As was found at the end 
of that section, the likelihood of an individual teacher staying in the field increases as h, the 
variable measuring job-worker match, rises. Since it is difficult to measure job-worker match, I 
will use satisfaction with the career as a proxy. On the SASS, there is a question that asks 
whether or not the individual would be a teacher if they could go back to college and start over. I 
create a new dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher responded “yes” to this question. I then 
stratify along this satisfaction variable. The results are presented in Table 2.9. Notice that for a 
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prior accountability system, an individual is more likely to leave the field if they are unhappy 
with the field of teaching as seen in column 2. However, the difference between those teachers 
that are happy and those that are not is not significant for the federal reform, with those results 
found in column 6. This is because, according to the model in section II, we are measuring the 
effect of h+v, job-worker match plus the wage shock. Additionally, the sign and magnitude of v 
is unknown and therefore makes the sign and magnitude of h+v unknown. This uncertainty can 
explain why the difference is no longer significant for the federal reform. 
 
 Table 2.10: Effect of Accountability System on Satisfaction 
Stratified by Year of Bachelor’s Degree 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pre Post Diff Pre Post Diff 
       
Type of reform State State State Federal Federal Federal 
       
Reform -0.1246* 0.0176 0.1422 0.0136 0.105 0.0914 
 (0.0685) (0.0566) (0.0889) (0.0320) (0.135) (0.1387) 
       
Observations 5,120 5,540  6,300 1,600  
Number of state 50 26  50 50  
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  
State FE YES YES  YES YES  
 
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. A state reform is any state-level accountability system enacted before 2002. The 
federal reform is NCLB. Columns 3 and 6 each show the results for a difference in mean test for the two columns it 
follows. A teacher’s satisfaction with teaching is determined by their response to the survey question “Would you 
teach again?” Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
I am interested on the effect that an accountability system has on a teacher’s view on 
teaching. I continue to use the survey question “Would you be a teacher again?” as a proxy for 
their satisfaction with the field. I run an OLS model with this satisfaction variable as the 
dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 2.10. While there is no significant effect 
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of either a state-level or federal-level accountability system on teacher satisfaction, the size of 
the difference in the effect accountability systems have on teacher happiness is notable.  
 
Table 2.11: Effect by where the teacher 
earned their bachelor’s degree 






    
Type of reform Federal Federal  
    
Reform 0.0469 0.0325 0.0144 
 
 
(0.0455) (0.0388) (0.0598) 
Observations 3,110 4,320  
Number of state 50 50  
Year FE YES YES  
State FE YES YES  
    
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. A treated degree is when the teacher earned their bachelor’s degree in state that was 
affected by NCLB. A control degree is if the teacher earned their degree in a state that had a previous accountability 
system. The federal reform is NCLB. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
For one final test, I split the sample into two categories based on where they earned their 
Bachelor’s degree. If the degree was earned in one of the 24 states that did not have a state-wide 
accountability system prior to NCLB, then that teacher is said to have earned their degree in a 
“treated” state. The remaining teachers that earned their degree in a state with some previous 
system in place is said to have earned it in a “control” state. I stratify the sample into these two 
groups and present the results in Table 2.11. These results show if there was a difference 
between colleges and universities after they became “treated.” Column 1 shows the effect of 
NCLB on the likelihood of staying for teachers who earned their degree in a “treated” state while 
column 2 shows the results for those who graduated from a school in the “control” group. 
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Neither of these results is statistically significant. Additionally, the groups are not statistically 
different from each other. 
 
Discussion and Robustness Checks 
 One of the concerns with using the SASS-TFS questionnaires is that a smaller subset of 
individuals replies to the TFS than those that fill out the SASS. This could negatively impact my 
results if the reason for replying to the TFS is endogenous with some characteristics. However, 
by testing for the differences in means between the SASS sample and the TFS sample, I find the 
two are statistically equivalent. This can be found in Appendix Table 2.1. 
 NCLB, as well as any state accountability system, solely impacts public schools. Private 
schools are not required to obey the guidelines found in these systems. Therefore, I can use the 
private teachers in the sample as a robustness check to determine that only the public teachers 
were impacted by NCLB while private teachers remained largely unaffected. I split my sample 
into two groups, those that teach in a public school and those that teach in a private school. I 
further stratify the sample by considering the effect of the accountability systems relative to 
whether or not the teacher earned their bachelor’s degree before the system was implemented or 
after. The results are presented in Appendix Table 2.2. It can be seen that the effect on private 
school teachers is significantly different from the effect on public school teachers for those that 
earned their degree after 2002, but relatively similar for teachers who earned their Bachelor’s 
before 2002, in that neither private school teachers nor public school teachers are significantly 
impacted by the reform. This result is also found in statewide accountability systems at larger 
magnitudes. So earning a degree before the state implemented their system does not have a 
significant impact on the likelihood of staying regardless of whether or not the individual teaches 
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in a private school or a public school. However, if he or she earned their degree after the 
accountability system was implemented in their state, then they are much more likely to stay in 
the field if they are working in a public school relative to their private school counterparts. 
It is also likely that school characteristics for the school at which the individual teaches, 
largely impacts a teacher’s decision to stay in the field following implementation of an 
accountability system. I consider many of these in the appendix. Of particular interest is the 
composition of students which can be seen in Appendix table 2.3 through Appendix table 2.7. 
Appendix Table 2.3 shows the effect stratified along the percent of students who are not native 
English speakers or limited English proficient (lep). I rank all the schools according to the 
percent of lep students that attend that school. I then split these schools into quintiles and 
consider the effect of an accountability system stratified by which quintile the school falls in. I 
consider the extreme cases in Appendix Table 2.3 of the first quintile with the lowest proportion 
of lep students and the fifth quintile of schools with the largest proportion. There is no significant 
effect on a teacher’s likelihood of staying for a state-level system. Yet, for a federal-level system, 
teachers are 8 percentage points more likely to stay if they teach in a school with a low number 
of lep students. However, this is not significantly different from those that teach in a fifth quintile 
school.  
Appendix Table 2.4 shows the effect stratified by the percent of students who are eligible 
for a free or reduced lunch (frl) again considering the first quintile and the fifth quintile. There is 
not significant effect for either state-level or federal-level accountability systems. Appendix 
Table 2.5 and 2.6 show the effect of an accountability system, NCLB in Appendix Table 2.5 and 
state accountability system in Appendix Table 2.6, stratified by racial quintiles, again comparing 
first and fifth quintiles for Asian students, black students, Hispanic students, Native American 
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students, and white students. After NCLB, teachers that work at schools with the lowest 
proportion of black students were 23 percent more likely to stay in the profession. This effect 
was significantly different from those that taught in schools with the largest proportion of black 
students (or the fifth quintile). This effect and the difference between the quintiles is not present 
for the state-level system. Appendix Table 2.7 stratifies along student proficiency as measured 
by the schools making AYP or missing AYP in consecutive years. This table only considers the 
effect of a federal-level system as AYP is a component of NCLB. The effect on staying is not 
significant for schools that made or missed AYP for a single year. 
 I also include interaction terms in my model. I interact the treatment with age and 
experience to see if the effect of age or experience changes after the accountability system is 
present. The results are in Appendix Table 2.8. Column 1 shows the effect of the age interaction 
and experience interaction from a state-level accountability system. I then stratify according to 
when a Bachelor’s degree was earned. Column 2 shows those teachers who earned their degree 
before their respective state passed an accountability system. Column 3 shows the results for 
those who earned their degree after it was passed. Columns 4 to 6 show the effect of interaction 
terms on the likelihood of teachers staying in the field for federal-level systems. Column 4 shows 
the effect on all teachers in the sample. Column 5 shows the effect on teachers who earned their 
Bachelor’s degree prior to NCLB and column 6 shows the effect on those teachers who earned 
their degree after NCLB. 
In Appendix Tables 2.10 through 2.17, I show the results from a probit model to consider 
the effect of accountability systems on the likelihood of staying. The logit results mirror what 
was found from the probit models and therefore I only include the probit results in the appendix. 




As a final investigative test I determine how the general makeup of teachers changed 
after No Child Left Behind was signed. I focus on three main changes: the probability of an 
individual teacher specializing in math while earning their degree, the probability of an 
individual teacher specializing in reading while earning their degree, and the probability that a 
teacher failed at least one Praxis examination. I focus on those who specialized in math and 
reading because those are the two subjects tested by NCLB. This would suggest that any teacher 
who taught one of those two subjects would be under more scrutiny than another subject since 
math and reading scores directly influence whether a school makes Adequate Yearly Progress. 
This additional scrutiny could lead to education majors leaving those subjects and choosing some 
other specialization. The results from these models can be found in Appendix Table 2.18.  
Additionally, I determine the likelihood of an individual teacher failing at least one Praxis 
test as a proxy for teacher quality. The Praxis test measures test taker’s knowledge and skills. It 
is a crucial component of licensing and certifications for teachers. There are several content 
specific Praxis tests that the potential educators must take in order to be a certified teacher. I run 
a model with a binary dependent variable which is equal to 1 if the teacher never failed a Praxis 
test. The results are also presented in Appendix Table 2.18. 
 In column 1 of Appendix Table 2.18, I have the change in likelihood of a teacher 
specializing in math while earning their degree after NCLB was signed. Teachers were 12 
percentage points less likely to choose this specialization after the federal reform took effect. 
This effect is not present for teachers specializing in reading, which can be seen in column 2. In 
column 3 I show how the likelihood of a teacher failing at least one Praxis test changes after 
NCLB takes effect. Teachers are 1.5 percentage points more likely to fail at least one Praxis test 
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after No Child Left Behind took effect. 
 The introduction of NCLB seems to have a positive effect on teachers choosing to stay in 
the field. This seems to contradict the media’s interpretation of NCLB’s effect on teachers. 
Toppo (2007), Hefling (2012) all find that teachers describe the policy as “unfair,” and provide 
generally unfavorable views. However, teachers’ actions say otherwise as several studies 
considering NCLB’s impact on teaching environment have shown the opposite result. Grissom, 
Nicholson-Crotty, and Harrington (2014) find that NCLB has a positive effect on teachers’ job 
satisfaction
5
. This higher job satisfaction should lead to lower turnover. Similarly, Sun, Saultz, 
and Ye (2014) find that teachers are less likely to leave the profession after NCLB. They find an 
initial increase in turnover in 2003-2004, but as I discussed above, it is ambiguous whether or not 
that effect is caused by NCLB. Additionally, they find that teachers are more likely to stay in the 
year 2007-2008. Finally, Loeb and Cunha (2007) also find no evidence that NCLB has resulted 
in an increase in turnover rate. While there is evidence that teachers dislike NCLB (Center on 
Education Policy (CEP) 2006; Deniston and Gerrity 2010; Sunderman, Tracey, Kim, and Orfield 
2004), it also seems that this displeasure is not large enough to leave the field. 
 One might think that, after NCLB or a similar accountability system was passed, the 
institutes of higher learning where the teachers earned their degrees, would change their 
curriculum to best prepare their students in how to handle the new landscape of teaching. By 
better preparing their students, these institutes could directly assist in lowering teacher turnover. 
In a somewhat surprising result, I find that the colleges and universities where the teachers are 
studying do not appear to have a strong influence on whether or not the teacher continues in the 
field. Instead, it appears that what state the teacher teaches in has a much larger effect on the 
                                                          
5
 It should be noted that they do find teachers feel they have less job security following No Child Left Behind, but 
overall satisfaction is up. 
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likelihood of an individual remaining in the field. It seems that schools in states with an 
accountability system before NCLB, can better prepare their new teachers for the stress that 
comes from operating under these types of systems. When it comes to teacher response to 
NCLB, it is not where you earned your degree that matters, but instead where you are currently 
teaching. 
 Since teachers who earned a degree after NCLB are more likely to stay in the field, 
perhaps there is a self-selection process that is occurring. I already showed that this process is 
not happening in the curriculum that is being presented by the colleges and universities that are 
preparing these teachers. Therefore, it must be happening prior to this curriculum being 
presented. Perhaps the general makeup of teachers is changing. That is, who chooses to become a 
teacher was affected by the passing of NCLB. The argument can be made that teachers may 
choose to avoid specializing in math or reading while earning their degree since those are the two 
tested subjects and therefore would put added stress on the teacher. My results do indicate that 
teachers avoided math education after NCLB. This suggests that potential teachers avoided 
specializing in what they might consider a “difficult” subject to teach. This result does not hold 
true for reading education, as there is not drop-off in the probability of specializing in reading 
after federal reform. Perhaps this is because reading is viewed as an “easier” subject to teach 
relative to math. 
 Finally, I looked at the quality of students who were becoming teachers by considering 
the probability of failing a Praxis test. After NCLB, potential educators were more likely to fail 
at least one of their Praxis examinations. This suggests that the pool of potential teachers are of a 
lesser quality following implementation of NCLB. It could be that a country-wide accountability 
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system is scaring away high quality teachers because they do not wish to teach in a high stress 
environment.    
 I now consider the assumption made in this paper as well as previous literature that states 
with a prior accountability system are not treated by NCLB. I consider the effect of these state 
reforms on turnover. 
 
Table 2.12: Effect of State 











Number of state 50 
Year FE YES 
State FE YES 
  
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
There is no significant impact of a statewide accountability system on turnover. 
Furthermore, stratifying these results according to age, experience, education level, and year of 
Bachelor’s Degree does not change this outcome. In each of these stratifications the effect of 
NCLB on turnover is not significant. These results do seem to highlight a problem with the 
model that is used as teachers do not respond the same to a prior accountability system as they do 
to NCLB. However, the results are still telling, since states without a prior accountability system 
did experience a much stronger reaction to the federal system as compared to their counterparts. 
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Future research can expand on and correct this issue by pairing control states and treated states 
that have similar guidelines and requirements. 
 
Conclusion 
I find that NCLB does not decrease the likelihood that a teacher remains in the field, but 
rather makes them 5 percentage points more likely to stay. Furthermore, any state accountability 
system that was enacted before NCLB had no measurable impact on teacher turnover. In 
addition, it seems that, even though NCLB was built on the pre-existing accountability polies, 
teachers are responding differently to NCLB than they did to prior systems. 
Most subgroups of teachers also follow this trend, whether the teacher is male, female, 
new, experienced, young, or old, teachers are more likely to stay in the field following the 
passage of NCLB. The largest driving force behind these results is when the individual earned 
their teaching degree. If he or she graduated after NCLB was signed, then they are more likely to 
stay in the field relative to their colleagues who earned a degree before 2002. This seems to 
suggest a self-selection process among potential teachers. 
Since there is no difference between whether the teacher’s alma mater was located in a 
“treated” state or a “control” state, it seems that it is not the colleges and universities preparing 
their students for a career under NCLB that is causing this self-selection process to occur. 
Therefore, this process must be happening among the potential teachers, perhaps even before 
admission into an education program. Further research would include using admission data from 
departments and schools of education to determine the viability of this claim. 
These findings can be used as an aid in understanding how accountability systems will 
impact student achievement as well as teacher behavior, which can further aid in the creation of 
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educational policies that advance student learning and improve teacher quality. Given the 
passage of waiver system signed by President Barack Obama in 2015, states are now able to 
remove themselves from NCLB guidelines. The next step in determining how teachers react to 
accountability systems is to observe if there is any change in turnover after states have excused 









For primary and secondary educators, earning tenure is an expected part of the job. In this 
paper I look at the effect that earning tenure has on teachers. In particular, how do teachers 
change their behavior in response to tenure and what impact does this change in behavior have 
on their students? Teacher tenure is a policy that prevents elementary and secondary teachers 
from being fired without just cause. It is a contract that guarantees employment except in cases 
of severe misconduct or incompetence. Even in instances of irresponsibility, misbehavior, or lack 
of performance, the process of firing a tenured teacher is time consuming and extremely 
expensive. Before tenure was standard, a teacher could be fired because of age, race, religion, or 
even favoritism. Women could even be fired if they became pregnant. 
 The biggest benefit that teachers receive from tenure is job security. Once they earn 
tenure a teacher can try new techniques or different methods that they were afraid to try before. It 
becomes incredibly difficult to fire a tenured teacher, as the cost to do so rises dramatically. 
Critics of tenure argue that this increased cost could lead to less accountability for the 
teacher. Historically, experience in the school district is the primary factor (and in some cases the 
only factor) in making tenure decisions. Before 2009 not a single state based its tenure decisions 
on any measure of teacher effectiveness (2013 NCTQ Report).   
Lazear (2003) illustrates the potential problems that can arise from this type of tenure 
process. After a teacher earns tenure it becomes very costly to fire that individual. In an 18 year 
span there were only 39 tenured teachers who were fired in the entire state of Illinois (Kersten 
2006). Similarly, teachers are aware that the likelihood of getting fired decreases after earning 
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tenure, this could cause the quality of education to diminish for some teachers since there is no 
real punishment or rather the threat of punishment is reduced (Brill 2009 and Medina 2010).  
Han (2015) suggests tenure does not protect poor teachers since the districts know the 
quality of education issued from an individual instructor and can choose not to renew his or her 
contract. However, the incentive conflict occurs after the teacher has earned tenure. My question 
is not “does tenure protect bad teachers?” but rather “does tenure create bad teachers?” There is 
also no research that has been done on the effect of tenure on student performance. Jones (2015) 
finds evidence that teachers change their behaviors the year before they are up for tenure. This 
includes spending more money on their classroom, spending more time outside of school 
working on lesson plans and teaching strategies, and even spending more time meeting with 
parents. He also finds that a teacher’s behaviors return to normal within two years after earning 
tenure. However, tenure’s impact on student achievement is nonexistent.  
Several papers have looked at the effects that teacher behavior has on student 
performance. Ronfeldt, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2013) find that teacher turnover negatively impacts 
student test scores, a finding reinforced by Hanushek, Rivkin, and Schiman (2016). Hanushek 
(1971), Murnane and Phillips (1981), Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kane (2005), as well as Kane and 
Staiger (2008) all look at various teacher characteristics and the affect they have on student 
achievement. Sass, Hannaway, Xu, Figlio, and Feng (2012), Taylor and Tyler (2012), and 
Rothstein (2014) all look at the impact schools and school policy can have on student 
achievement. Yet, in all of these papers, tenure is absent. I aim to remedy that by determining the 
effect of earning tenure on student test scores. 
I use a pooled cross sectional data set of student level data and pair it with teacher and 
school data during the same time frame. I find that immediately after earning tenure, student test 
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scores drop. However, for each year of teaching after earning tenure those test scores begin to 
climb, quickly overtaking pre-tenure levels.  
 
Background on Teacher Tenure  
The history of tenure dates back to the 19
th
 century when teachers had little to no 
protection from being fired. In 1885, the National Education Association (NEA) asked for 
political assistance in protecting teachers. Massachusetts became the first state to pass a pre-
college tenure law for teachers in 1886. New Jersey was the first state to pass a comprehensive 
tenure law that protected all elementary and secondary teachers in 1909. Currently, in most 
states, a teacher is awarded tenure after he or she has taught for a certain period of time, 
somewhere between 1 and 5 years. Following the Great Depression, teacher unions gained a lot 
of power and fought for job protection and benefits, and by the 1950’s, 80% of all K-12 teachers 
were tenured (McGuinn 2010). As of 2008, 2.3 million teachers in America are tenured and this 
does not include those in post-secondary education (Stephey 2008). Each state has its own 
regulations for awarding tenure to a teacher, but generally the probationary period ranges from 1 
to 5 years. 
Several states have begun to modify their tenure laws (Christie and Zinth 2011). New 
York, for example, now holds their teachers accountable for the quality of their instruction that 
students are receiving as well as putting an emphasis on merit and performance. Colorado has 
made it possible for tenured teachers to lose their tenure. Ohio and California have increased the 
number of probationary years that a teacher must teach before earning tenure. 
Many of these changes came as a response to President Obama’s 2009 Race to the Top 
program which offered over $4 billion in grants to states who require schools to consider student 
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achievement when making tenure decisions (US Department of Education 2009). Yet, as a 
whole, states continue to ignore teacher performance in tenure reviews, only about half of all 
states use any kind of teaching evaluation while making tenure decisions (2013 NCTQ Report). 
There is a lot of discussion as to the benefits and consequences that can arise from tenure. 
Under current tenure laws, teachers are protected from being fired for a variety of reasons that 
were previously concerns. Teachers can no longer be fired for discriminatory purposes nor 
personal grudges or favoritism. It is also illegal to fire a tenured teacher in order to hire a less 
expensive replacement. In addition, teachers cannot be fired for teaching new or controversial 
ideas. 
There is, however, a negative side to tenure. By only firing a tenured teacher in the event 
of severe misconduct, it is impossible to impose accountability for student achievement. Since 
most states give tenure to all teachers after a certain period of time, there is no guarantee that all 
of these protected teachers are great or even sufficient educators. In addition, even if the teacher 
is guilty of misconduct, it is incredibly costly to fire them. For example, in 2010 the Los Angeles 
Unified School District spent $3.5 million in order to fire 7 teachers and the process took 5 years 
(Barrett 2012). The sheer magnitude of time and money spent to fire a tenured teacher will deter 
any serious disciplinary action in all but the most extreme cases. 
Critics of tenure argue that the policy fosters mediocrity among students and lowers the 
academic achievement in schools. A recent study by the New Teacher Project finds that 81% of 
schools admit to having low-performing tenured teachers, but over half of those schools will not 
act because of the tenure laws (Weisberg et al. 2009). However, those in favor of teacher tenure 





 Consider a general utility formula of  
𝛿𝑢 = 𝑤 + 𝑓(𝑒) − 𝑒 + (𝑏 + 𝑞)(𝑣 − 𝑢)                                     (3.1) 
Where δ is a discount factor and 0 < 𝛿 < 1, u is the utility obtained from working, w>0 
is the wage received from the current job. The amount of effort an individual exerts in their 
profession is represented by e, and f(e) is function of effort that measures the psychological 
payoffs a teacher receives from working (Lortie 1975). Let 𝑓(0) = 0, and 𝑓′(𝑒) > 0. The 
variable b is the probability of the individual being fired for reasons not related to performance 
(downsizing, budget cuts, etc), q is the probability of being fired for shirking, with both 0 < 𝑏 <
1, and 0 < 𝑞 < 1. Finally, v is the utility earned from being unemployed.  
 My model closely follows Stiglitz and Shapiro (1984) model of shirking and efficiency 
wages with a measure of additional utility not related to pay included. Given equation (3.1), a 
teacher has one single decision to make, whether to shirk or to put forth effort. If an individual 
chooses to shirk then 𝑒 = 0. Additionally, 𝑓(𝑒) = 0 by definition and 𝑞 > 0. This gives us a 
specific utility function of 
𝑢𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑘 =
𝑤 + (𝑏 + 𝑞)𝑣
𝛿 + 𝑏 + 𝑞
                                                           (3.2) 
If instead, a teacher chooses to put forth nonzero effort into their teaching, then 𝑒 > 0 
which implies 𝑓(𝑒) > 0. Also, by not choosing to shirk, the probability of being fired for 
shirking is 0, 𝑞 = 0. This gives us a utility function for working. 
𝑢𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 =
𝑤 + 𝑓(𝑒) − 𝑒 + 𝑏𝑣
𝛿 + 𝑏
                                                       (3.3) 
A teacher will choose to shirk if and only if 𝑢𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑘 > 𝑢𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘. This inequality simplifies to 
𝑞(𝛿𝑣 − 𝑤) − (𝛿 + 𝑏 + 𝑞)(𝑓(𝑒) − 𝑒) > 0                                             (3.4) 
59 
 
As long as equation (3.4) is true, the individual will shirk. The first term measures the expected 
difference between unemployment benefits and current wage. The second term measures the 
discounted expected difference between benefit and cost of effort. Thus, if equation (3.4) is true, 
then the worker would get a higher payoff from being unemployed then the payoff received by 
spending positive effort. 
 If we assume that teachers get no psychological payoff from working, that is 𝑓(𝑒) = 0, 
then we obtain the findings found in Stiglitz and Shapiro (1984). Unless there is a penalty 
associated with unemployment, everyone will shirk. However, by introducing f(e), it is now 
possible for an individual to obtain a nonwage payoff from increased effort. Thus, by choosing 
not to shirk, the second term in equation (3.4) increases thereby introducing an implicit cost to 
unemployment benefits, the opportunity cost of teaching. 
 If w is high enough, a teacher will choose not to shirk. This cutoff wage, x, is obtained by 
solving equation (3.4) for w. 
𝑤 <
(𝛿 + 𝑏 + 𝑞)(𝑒 − 𝑓(𝑒))
𝑞
+ 𝛿𝑣 = 𝑥                                         (3.5) 




𝛿 − 𝛿𝑓′(𝑒) + 𝑏 − 𝑏𝑓′(𝑒) + 𝑞 − 𝑞𝑓′(𝑒)
𝑞
















(𝛿 + 𝑏)(𝑓(𝑒) − 𝑒)
𝑞2
                                                             (3.9) 
𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑣
= 𝛿                                                                       (3.10) 
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If an employer pays a high enough wage the employee will choose not to shirk. For teachers who 
receive some psychological payoffs, this wage decreases in δ, and b if and only if 𝑓(𝑒) > 𝑒. 
Similarly, the cutoff wage decreases in e if 𝑓′(𝑒) > 1. This means that a school can pay a lower 
wage to its teachers and still be able to prevent them from shirking as long as the psychological 
payoffs received from teaching overcome the effort spent. I want to put extra emphasis on 
equation (3.9) as it shows that the cutoff wage increases in q, the probability of being fired for 
shirking, as long as 𝑓(𝑒) > 𝑒. This suggests that after a teacher earns tenure, and q drops, the 
cutoff wage will similarly drop as long as the benefit from effort outweighs the cost. 
 
Data and Methods 
In order to examine the impact of tenure on test scores, I acquired student level data 
including standardized test scores. In addition to student level data, I also collected data on 
teacher and school characteristics which includes whether or not a teacher earns tenure in a given 
year. The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) is the largest nationally 
representative and continuing assessment of what America's students know and can do in various 
subject areas. Assessments are conducted periodically in mathematics, reading, science, writing, 
art, civics, economics, geography, history, and even technology and engineering. 
Since NAEP assessments are administered uniformly using the same sets of test booklets 
across the nation, NAEP results serve as a common metric for all states. The assessment stays 
essentially the same from year to year, with only carefully documented changes. This permits 
NAEP to provide a clear picture of student academic progress over time. The number of 
questions in a given booklet is very large and each student only answers a small subset of all 
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available questions. NAEP uses the answers received from students to predict what the score 
would be if these students took the entire test using Item Response Theory (IRT). 
 IRT determines a method that can accurately predict the probability that a given student 
will answer a question correctly. The probability for a student of ability 𝜃𝑘to select answer i for 
question j is 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗(𝜃𝑘). Once outcome x is observed, the likelihood function can be found: 







Where 𝑚𝑗 is the number of categories for answers to question j for the given question, 
and 𝑢𝑖𝑗 is an indicator variable equal to 
𝑢𝑖𝑗 = {




The likelihood function develops a relationship between as student’s answers and the 
parameters of the question as well as to the student’s ability. The question’s parameters are found 
using marginal maximum likelihood methods which are iterative procedures used to estimate 
these parameters from an initial distribution of scale scores. Based on this initial distribution, 
interim estimates of parameters are calculated which are then used to recalculate new parameters. 
This process is continued until the values converge on estimates for the IRT model. These 
estimates can be used to find a likelihood function for a student by using the items answered by 
that student. This likelihood function can then be used to make inferences about score 
distributions from samples where no student answers all of the items. For NAEP calculations, 
estimates of questions parameters are obtained using a NAEP BILOG/PARSCALE program, 
which combines the findings of Mislevy and Bock (1982) and Muraki and Bock (1991). 
The NAEP then normalizes these results so that a value of 0 is the mean and a value of 
1.0 is one standard deviation away from the mean. I will use this normalized value as the 
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measure of student achievement from 2003 to 2007, which gives me 3 years of data since the 
NAEP is issued every other year. I use the NAEP results based on representative samples of 
students in grades 4 and 8. These grades and ages are chosen by the NCES because they 
represent critical junctures in academic achievement. These assessments follow 
the framework developed by the National Assessment Governing Board, and use the latest 
advances in assessment methodology. 
I will follow Jones (2015) and take advantage of the staggered issuance of tenure. Some 
states such as Texas and New York assign tenure after 3 years, whereas some states such as 
Indiana and Missouri award teachers tenure after 5 years. Some states even award tenure after 
one year of experience (Mississippi for example). Existing literature finds that the vast majority 
of teachers teach close to where they grew up. Reininger (2011) finds that 85% of teachers teach 
within 40 miles of their hometown. Using these results, I make the assumption that the time 
before tenure is exogenous to the teacher and they are not using it to determine where they teach. 
The list of tenure requirements for each state is found in Appendix Table 3.1 and graphically in 
Appendix Figure 3.1. This allows me to operate with the assumption that all teachers with t years 
of experience are the same, but some of them are awarded tenure and others are not. I then use a 
difference in difference approach to examine the impact that tenure has on teachers. The treated 
group is the teachers who were awarded tenure and the control group is the other teachers with 
the same amount of experience that have not been given tenure yet due to their state’s longer 
probationary period. 
 My empirical specification is as follows 
𝑉𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑦 = 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑦 +∑𝑘_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
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𝑘=1
+ 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑠 + 𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑠 + 𝑆𝑠𝑦 + 𝑌𝑡𝑠𝑦 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑦 
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The dependent variable (V) is normalized NAEP score for student i, paired with teacher t, 
at school s, during year y. The two variables of interest are earn which is a dummy equal to 1 if 
the teacher earned tenure this year. We also draw attention to k_years_post which is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the teacher is in their kth year after earning tenure. X, T, S, and Y contain 
characteristics for the student, the teacher, the school, and the year respectively. The basic 
structure of using a dependent variable at the student level and comparing effects of 




 A brief overview of the descriptive statistics that describe the students and teachers in my 
sample follow. Table 3.1 shows information on the students and Table 3.2 shows means for 













    
Age 40.52 33.853 45.277 
    
Experience 11.698 4.687 16.701 
    
Percent Female 0.723 0.721 0.724 
    
Percent Asian 0.016 0.025 0.014 
    
Percent Black 0.065 0.083 0.061 




























































    
 
 
The average teacher in the sample is 40.5 years old and has almost 12 years of 
experience. When isolating only teachers who have not earned tenure yet, those numbers drop to 
roughly 34 years old and almost 5 years of experience. For currently tenured teachers, the 
average age is 45 with nearly 17 years of experience. Women make up nearly three fourths of the 
sample regardless of subset. Over 60 percent of teachers are white, a number that approaches 70 
percent when considering untenured teachers. While the vast majority of all teachers have a 
65 
 
Bachelor’s Degree, a Master’s Degree is much more common among tenured teachers with 73 
percent owning one compared to the 50 percent of untenured individuals. 
 









    
Age 10.842 10.817 10.848 
    
Percent Female 0.490 0.497 0.489 






































































Observations 2,166,860 392,720 1,774,140 
    
 
 
 Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics for students in the sample as a whole and then those 
same statistics stratified by whether their teacher has tenure or not. The numbers are largely the 





 graders. So the majority of students in the sample are 9, 10, 13, or 14 years old. 
Almost half of the students are female, 5 percent are of Asian descent, 20 percent are Black, 
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roughly 15 percent are Hispanic, and a little over 2 percent are Native American. White students 
make up 60 percent of the sample. Almost 14 percent of students have an Individualized 
Education Plan (IEP), which is generally assigned to students with disabilities or learning 
disorders. 7 percent have Limited English Proficiency (LEP). Almost half of all students come 
from households where the total income is low enough to qualify that student for a Free or 
Reduced Lunch (FRL). 
 









    
Percent Asian 0.023 0.022 0.001 
 (0.1504) (0.1467)  
Percent Black 0.093 0.097 -0.004 



























































    
 
Table 3.3 compares teachers the year before they are eligible for tenure and the year after 















1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Normalized 
Score 
Year of Teaching 
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Normalized 
Score 
Year of Teaching 









In both Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, we do not observe many reductions in test scores 
following tenure-ship (The change is negative only for Math scores when the teacher earns 
tenure after 1 or 2 years). However, the increase in test scores for teachers the year after they 
earn tenure is lower than for their counterparts not earning tenure that year. These figures also 
illustrate that a teacher earning tenure before they have gained 3 years of experience seems to 
stunt their ability as an educator. The scores for teachers who earn tenure after 1 or 2 years is 
lower than for those who earn tenure after 3 to 5 years. The linear trend for all groups follow the 




In Figure 3.3 we see that test scores largely follow an increasing trend over time. 
However, when a teacher earns tenure and moves from -1 year since tenure (year before) to 0 












-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Normalized Test 
Score 
Years Since Tenure 












   
Earn -0.0125*** -0.01089*** 
 (0.00410) (0.00409) 
1 Year Post 0.0258*** 0.0362*** 
 (0.00419) (0.00411) 
2 Years Post 
 
3 Years Post 
 

















Observations 863,980 878,410 
Number of state 50 50 
Year FE YES YES 
State FE YES YES 
 
Test scores are negatively impacted the year a teacher earns tenure. The effect is rather 
small, falling less than 0.02 standard deviations for both Math and Reading. Furthermore, for 
each year after earning tenure, in both Math scores and Reading scores, test scores rise. This 
pattern holds through the first 20 years post tenure-ship.  
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Earn 0.00772 -0.0455*** 0.0230 0.0488 -0.01024*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0155) (0.0206) (0.0395) (0.00508) 
1 Year Post 0.0220 0.0665*** 0.0558*** 0.00533 0.0496*** 
 (0.0368) (0.0151) (0.0208) (0.0388) (0.00519) 
2 Years Post 
 
3 Years Post 
 

































Observations 1,030 4,890 2,290 990 45,290 
Number of state 50 50 50 50 50 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES 
 














      
Earn 0.0262 -0.0190 -0.0595*** 0.0538 -0.0178*** 
 (0.0343) (0.0187) (0.0223) (0.0442) (0.00639) 
1 Year Post 0.0309 0.0550*** 0.00906 0.0594 0.0703*** 
 (0.0328) (0.0175) (0.0221) (0.0424) (0.00630) 
2 Years Post 
 
3 Years Post 
 

































Observations 950 3,180 1,780 660 30,770 
Number of state 50 50 50 50 50 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 




 Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the effect of tenure on reading and math scores respectively 
while stratifying the teacher by race. The positive influence of further experience following 
tenure is largely universal among both subjects and all races. However, the statistically 
significant negative impact of tenure is not. For reading test scores only black and white teachers 
exhibit a negative change, whereas for math scores it is Hispanic teachers as well as white 
teachers that show a significant decrease once earning tenure. 
 
Discussion 
Tenure does seem to lead to a decrease in test scores. Regardless of subject, students 
exhibit between a 0.01 to 0.02 standard deviation decline during the year following when their 
teacher earns tenure. This decline appears to be temporary since test scores to start to rise again 
for each year taught following earning tenure. 
This seems to contradict what we would expect to see once an employee is awarded with 
“guaranteed job security.” It is surprising that test scores do increase after the slight drop 
following tenure being awarded. This could speak to the type of people that generally choose to 
become teachers. These individuals are likely to be more altruistic and less rational in an 
economic sense. Teachers gain utility not only from financial value, but also from personal, 
emotional, and “psychic” rewards (Lortie 1975). This could suggest that teachers are not 
rationally choosing to put forth less effort, but instead are recovering from the previous year 
(their final year before earning tenure). As Jones 2015 finds, teachers spend more time and 




My theoretical model also supports this claim as long as we assume that during the year 
the teacher earns tenure they are exerting enough effort to cause 𝑓(𝑒) < 𝑒, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of shirking. However, after the individual has recuperated from the effort spent to earn 
tenure, they return to the point where 𝑓(𝑒) > 𝑒 thereby earning the psychological payoff 
associated with teaching. 
The test scores for a teacher who just earned tenure is -0.1101 and the linear effect of 
experience on test scores is 0.0073. So a back of the envelope calculation tells us that earning 
tenure is associated with lower test scores of the magnitude 0.1174. One of the biggest 
arguments against tenure for elementary and secondary school teachers is that it provides an 
incentive to stop quality instruction. While this is true in the short run, the slight reduction in test 
scores is short lived and is overcome the following year. There are many other discussions that 




 One perennial fear with awarding tenure to elementary and secondary teachers is that 
tenure incentivizes teachers to put forth less effort into their teaching since they will not be 
punished in the form of job loss. In this paper I considered the effect that earning tenure can have 
on student test scores by taking advantage of the staggered issuance of tenure among school 
districts. While it does appear that students are less productive the year after their teacher earns 




 In addition, the effect that tenure has on student achievement is minor compared to other 
student characteristics such as whether the student has an IEP, or whether or not the student is 
LEP. Additionally, socio-economic status is incredibly important in determining a student’s 
achievement. 
 While the result from my analysis is statistically significant, the magnitude of the 
decrease (slightly greater than 0.01 standard deviations) is a very small practical effect. Dahl and 
Lochner (2012) find that this is equivalent to roughly $160-$170 reduction in income. There are 
other potential problems and concerns associated with tenure policy, but the negative impact on 
students due to poor incentives is minor and should not be used as the sole reason to discontinue 




The following figure shows the first year that an accountability system was introduced in each state. 
These years are obtained from Dee and Jacobs (2011). 
 
Appendix Figure 2.1: Prior Accountability System by State 
 
Alaska introduced an accountability system in 1997. Hawaii had no prior accountability system and was 
treated by NCLB. 
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Appendix Table 2.1. SASS and TFS robustness 
    
 SASS 
values 
TFS values Diff 




















































Appendix Table 2.2: Private Teachers 
Robustness Check 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Private Public Diff 
 
























    









    









    
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. A state reform is any state-level accountability system enacted before 2002. The 
federal reform is NCLB. The sample is split into those teachers who earned their Bachelor’s degree before the 
reform occurred and those who earned their degree after. Column 3 shows the difference in mean between private 
teachers and public teachers for each category. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  




Appendix Table 2.3: Effect by lep quintile 





































Reform 0.00482 0.0213 0.0165 0.104*** 0.0452 0.0588 
 (0.0316) (0.0556) (0.0640) (0.0345) (0.0426) (0.0548) 
       
Observations 2,550 1,650  2,960 1,730  
Number of state 50 49  50 49  
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  
State FE YES YES  YES YES  
       
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. A state reform is any state-level accountability system enacted before 2002. The 
federal reform is NCLB. The sample is divided into those teachers who teach at a school with a low number of 
students that are limited English proficient as opposed to those that teach at schools with a high proportion of 
students that are limited English proficient. Columns 3 and 6 each show the result of a difference in mean test for the 
two columns before it. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  







Appendix Table 2.4: Stratified along district salary 






















       
Type of reform State State  Federal Federal  
       
Reform -0.190 0.133 0.323 0.0515 0.249 0.198 












Number of state 49 49  50 50  
State FE YES YES  YES YES  
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  
       
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. A state reform is any state-level accountability system enacted before 2002. The 
federal reform is NCLB. To represent district income I look at the proportion of students that are eligible for free 
and reduced lunch. The sample is divided into teachers at schools with a high proportion eligible for frl and those 
that teach at a school with low proportion of frl. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  






Appendix Table 2.5: NCLB Effect Stratified by Race Quintile 












        
Asian 0.0458 0.0518 0.006 49 YES YES  
 (0.0400) (0.0466) (0.0614) 49 YES YES  
        
Black 0.230*** 0.0324 0.198** 48 YES YES  
 (0.0467) (0.0453) (0.0651) 38 YES YES  
        
Hispanic 0.00134 0.0543 0.0530 49 YES YES  
 (0.0466) (0.0465) (0.0658) 42 YES YES  
        
Native 0.0253 0.0580 0.0327 50 YES YES  
 (0.0310) (0.0435) (0.0534) 49 YES YES  
        
White 0.0939** 0.0394 0.0545 45 YES YES  
 (0.0426) (0.0461) (0.0628) 48 YES YES  
        
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. The federal reform is NCLB. I divide the sample into quintiles based on the 
proportion of students that are the given races. I then look at the results for the first and fifth quintiles. Column 3 
shows the results of a difference in mean test for each race. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  








Appendix Table 2.6: Prior System Effect Stratified by Race 
Quintile 





















































































 (0.0426) (0.0481) (0.0643) 48 YES YES 
       
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. The federal reform is NCLB. I divide the sample into quintiles based on the 
proportion of students that are the given races. I then look at the results for the first and fifth quintiles. Column 3 
shows the results of a difference in mean test for each race. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  









Appendix Table 2.7: Effect of NCLB stratified by Adequate Yearly 
Progress (AYP) 











       
Reform -0.00648 0.339 0.345 0.683* -0.0575 0.741 












Number of state 49 49  46 41  
State FE YES YES  YES YES  
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  
       
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. A state reform is any state-level accountability system enacted before 2002. The 
federal reform is NCLB. A school is determined as having made Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) if enough student 
subgroups are considered proficient according to the guidelines set by that state. If a school fails to reach AYP two 
consecutive years then sanctions are placed on that school. Those schools make up the sample for column 5. Diff 
shows the results of a difference in mean test for the two columns immediately before. Standard errors are clustered 
at the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Appendix Table 2.8: Effect of interaction terms on staying 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Pre Post All Pre Post 
       
Type of reform State State State Federal Federal Federal 
       
Reform*age 0.000908 0.00332* -0.0120*** 0.00285** 0.00321** -0.00953 
 (0.00140) (0.00182) (0.00413) (0.00144) (0.00160) (0.00702) 
Reform*exp 8.39e-05 -0.00223 0.00893* -0.00261 -0.00173 -0.0220 















Number of state 50 50 50 50 50 50 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. A state reform is any state-level accountability system enacted before 2002. The 
federal reform is NCLB. Pre contains all teachers who earned their Bachelor’s degree before the listed reform took 
effect. Post inludes those who earned their degree after the reform occurred. Standard errors are clustered at the state 
level.  





Appendix Table 2.9: Effect of Accountability System on attitude toward teaching stratified by year of 
bachelor’s degree 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 









         
Type of reform State State State  Federal Federal Federal  
         
Reform 0.0058 0.1709** 0.1963* 0.0254 0.0331 0.129 0.0339 0.0951 
















Number of state 50 26 50  50 50 50  
State FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES  
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES  
         
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. A state reform is any state-level accountability system enacted before 2002. The 
federal reform is NCLB. Pre contains all teachers who earned their Bachelor’s degree before the listed reform took 
effect. Post includes those who earned their degree after the reform occurred. Diff shows the results of a difference 
in mean test for the two columns immediately before. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Appendix Table 2.10: Effect on NCLB on staying, probit 
model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Pre Post Diff 
     
Reform 0.0935 0.0118 0.987*** 0.9752** 










     
Probit model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching 
in the Teacher Follow-up Survey. The federal reform is NCLB. Pre contains all teachers who earned their 
Bachelor’s degree before the listed reform took effect. Post includes those who earned their degree after the reform 
occurred. Diff shows the results of a difference in mean test for the two columns immediately before. Standard 
errors are clustered at the state level.  




Appendix Table 2.11: Effect of NCLB on 
staying stratified by age, probit model 




    
Reform 0.261 0.174 0.0165 









    
Probit model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching 
in the Teacher Follow-up Survey. The federal reform is NCLB. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Appendix Table 2.12: Effect of NCLB on 
staying stratified by degree, probit model 




    
reform 0.208** -0.0465 0.2545* 
 (0.0896) (0.102) (0.1358) 
    
Observations 4,850 3,140  
    
Probit model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching 
in the Teacher Follow-up Survey. The federal reform is NCLB. Diff shows the result of a difference in mean test for 
the two columns prior. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Appendix Table 2.13: Effect of NCLB on 
staying stratified by experience, probit 
model 




    
Reform 0.157 0.0314 0.00359 









    
Probit model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching 
in the Teacher Follow-up Survey. The federal reform is NCLB. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  




Appendix Table 2.14: Effect of prior system on 
staying, probit model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Pre Post Diff 
     
Reform -0.0920 0.500* 0.0360 0.464 
 (0.0644) (0.266) (0.223) (0.3471) 
     
Observations 7,660 5,360 5,200  
     
Probit model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching 
in the Teacher Follow-up Survey. A state reform is any state-wide accountability system that took effect prior to 
2002. Pre contains all teachers who earned their Bachelor’s degree before the listed reform took effect. Post includes 
those who earned their degree after the reform occurred. Diff shows the results of a difference in mean test for the 
two columns immediately before. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Appendix Table 2.15: Effect of prior 
system on staying stratified by age, probit 
model 
    
 < 25 25-35 35+ 
    
Prior 0.0760 -0.0724 -0.0929 
 (0.231) (0.116) (0.0858) 
    
Observations 890 2,450 4,290 
    
Probit model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching 
in the Teacher Follow-up Survey. A state reform is any state-wide accountability system that took effect prior to 
2002. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Appendix Table 2.16: Effect of prior 
system on staying stratified by experience, 
probit model 
    
 < 3 3-15 15+ 
    
Reform 0.0282 -0.207* -0.0994 
 (0.120) (0.107) (0.121) 
    
Observations 2,750 2,780 2,130 
    
Probit model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching 
in the Teacher Follow-up Survey. A state reform is any state-wide accountability system that took effect prior to 
2002. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  




Appendix Table 2.17: Effect of prior system 
on staying stratified by degree, probit model 




    
Reform -0.0512 -0.192* 0.1408 
 (0.0846) (0.104) (0.1341) 
    
Observations 4,750 2,810  
Probit model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching 
in the Teacher Follow-up Survey. A state reform is any state-wide accountability system that took effect prior to 
2002. Diff shows the results of a difference in mean test for the previous two columns. Standard errors are clustered 
at the state level.  





Appendix Table 2.18: How Teacher Makeup 
Changed 







    









    
Reform -0.12** 0.0012 0.015*** 









Number of state 50 50 50 
State FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
    
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. The federal reform is NCLB. Teach math is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
teacher majored in math education for their Bachelor’s degree. Teach reading is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the teacher majored in reading education for their Bachelor’s degree. Failed test is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the teacher failed at least one Praxis test. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Appendix Table 2.19: Effect of Accountability 
System on Staying by Sex 






    
Type of reform State State State 
    
Reform -0.0238 -0.00456 0.0192 
 (0.0230) (0.0379) (0.0443) 
    
Observations 5,940 2,390  
Number of state 50 50  
Year FE YES YES  
State FE YES YES  
OLS with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in the 
Teacher Follow-up Survey. The results are stratified by gender. Column 3  shows a difference in mean test for the 2 
columns it follows. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  






Appendix Table 2.20: Effect of Accountability System on 
Staying by Education Level 






    
Type of reform State State  
    
Reform -0.00498 -0.0611* 0.0561 
 (0.0248) (0.0358) (0.0436) 
    
Observations 4,680 2,780  
Number of state 50 50  
Year FE YES YES  
State FE YES YES  
OLS with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher was still teaching in the 
Teacher Follow-up Survey. The results are stratified by education level. I dropped the teachers with no Bachelor’s. 
Column 3 shows the results of a difference in mean test for the 2 columns it follows. Standard errors are clustered at 
the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
    
Appendix Table 2.21: Effect of Accountability 










    
Type of Reform State State State 
    
Reform 0.0107 -0.0122 -0.0239 
 (0.0532) (0.0370) (0.0277) 
    
Observations 910 2,430 4,100 
Number of state 50 50 50 
Year FE YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES 
 OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching 
in the Teacher Follow-up Survey. A state reform is any state-level accountability system enacted before 2002. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  








Appendix Table 2.22: Effect of Accountability 
System on Staying by Experience 
 (1) (2) (3) 









    
Type of Reform State State State 
    
Reform 0.0143 -0.0675 -0.0572 
 (0.0305) (0.0355) (0.0421) 
    
Observations 2,720 2,750 1,820 
Number of state 50 50 50 
Year FE YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES 
    
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. A state reform is any state-level accountability system enacted before 2002. Standard 
errors are clustered at the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Appendix Table 2.23: Effect of 
Accountability System on Staying by Year of 
Bachelor’s Degree 






    
Type of reform State State  
    
Reform 0.127* 0.124 0.003 
 (0.0731) (0.0820) (0.1100) 
Observations 6,960 5,100  
Number of state 50 26  
State FE YES YES  
Year FE YES YES  
    
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. A state reform is any state-level accountability system enacted before 2002. Column 
3 shows the results of a difference mean test for the 2 column it follows. Standard errors are clustered at the state 
level. 






Appendix Table 2.24: Effect of Accountability 
System on Staying by View on Continuing Teaching 









    
Type of reform State State State 
    
Reform -0.00129 -0.156*** 0.155*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0540) (0.0582) 
    
Observations 1,320 6,350  
Number of state 50 50  
Year FE YES YES  
State FE YES YES  
OLS model with stay as the dependent variable. Stay is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is still teaching in 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey. A state reform is any state-level accountability system enacted before 2002. Column 
3 shows the results for a difference in mean test for the 2 columns it follows. A teacher’s willingness to teach again 
is from the survey question “Would you be a teacher again?” Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  

















Hawaii California Alabama New Jersey Connecticut Indiana 
Mississippi Maine Alaska New Mexico Illinois Missouri 
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 Washington Florida Pennsylvania   
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